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Abstract 
Fundamental ontology is Heidegger's attempt to clarify the meaning of being through a 
descriptive analysis of human existence, which he conceives as a system of intentional 
relations that precedes the subject/object dichotomy. His interpretation of human being 
seems to promise an innovative solution to the problem of how we are corporeally 
immanent in nature at the same time as we transcend nature in our understanding. Yet 
Heidegger pays little attention to the problem of embodiment in fundamental ontology. 
This thesis addresses the question of what accounts for his neglect. In Chapter One, I 
formulate the problem in terms ofHeidegger's ontological concepts. Chapter Two shows 
that despite appearances to the contrary, the problem of embodiment is crucial for 
fundamental ontology. Chapter Three develops the central claim of the thesis, which is 
that Heidegger neglects embodiment because to treat it adequately threatens to undermine 
the transcendental character of fundamental ontology. 
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Introduction 
Wittgenstein defined a philosophical problem as one for which we know the 
solution provided no one asks it of us, but which throws us into a muddle the moment it 
is explicitly raised. 1 Considered in this light, the problem of embodiment is 
philosophically exemplary. For while we go about our lives with an implicit 
understanding of the fact that, as bodily beings, we are subject to the natural laws of the 
world we perceive, this situation becomes problematic upon reflection. In our role as the 
subjects of perception, knowledge and action, we experience ourselves as transcending 
nature, where nature is understood, following Merleau-Ponty, as a multiplicity of events 
bound together by relations of causality.2 Transcending the network of causal relations, 
we are somehow brought into communion with it by means of our bodies. But since our 
bodies are integrated into the network of causal relations, we also experience ourselves as 
the objects of perception and knowledge and as the recipients of action. The problem of 
embodiment is the problem of how to render intelligible our immanence in the natural 
order we transcend. 
Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology seems to promise an innovative 
solution to the problem of embodiment. Heidegger argues that whereas traditional 
ontology has endeavoured to distinguish the various kinds ofbeings (res extensa and res 
cogitans in modem ontology) and to explicate their ontological constitution (existentia 
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1953), 42 (#89). 
2 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, trans. Alden L. Fisher (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1963), 3. 
1 
and essentia in medieval ontology), it has failed to elucidate being, that which somehow 
belongs to all beings.3 Indeed, the tradition has viewed such a task as unnecessary, since 
the meaning of "being" has been taken as self-evident.4 For Heidegger, the apparent self-
evidence of the meaning of "being" conceals an important philosophical problem. 
Clearly we understand what we mean by "being" to some extent, since we use the verb 
"to be" constantly and successfully. Yet despite such constant usage, we find ourselves at 
a loss when asked to explain what we mean by it. The understanding of being implicit in 
such utterances as "It is raining" or "I am happy" remains conceptually unclarified, or, as 
Heidegger puts it, "pre-ontological."5 The purpose of fundamental ontology is to bring 
our pre-ontological understanding of the meaning of being, or of what it means for beings 
to be, to conceptual clarity.6 
For Heidegger, the meaning of something is the condition of the possibility of its 
intelligibility. 7 Thus, for example, the meaning of a glass is its use as an implement for 
drinking-were it not for our practice of drinking (and of other activities in which glasses 
3 "Beings" translates das Seiende, which could also be rendered as "entities" or as "that which is." "Being" 
translates Sein, the infmitive form of the verb "to be." The fact that "being" translates a verb is important. 
When Heidegger investigates being, he is not investigating a thing or substance that beings have, but the 
event by virtue of which beings are encountered in human thought and practice. 
4 BT, 22, 23/H3, 4. H indicates the original German pagination. 
5 BT, 32/H12. Like the problem of embodiment, Heidegger's question of the meaning of being exemplifies 
Wittgenstein's description of the nature of a philosophical problem. 
6 One might object that fundamental ontology presents an impossible task, since being, as the most general 
of concepts, is indefmable. Heidegger responds to this objection by arguing that the indefmability of being 
does not render the meaning of being unproblematic. On the contrary: the indefmability of being makes 
the question of its meaning even more worthy of philosophical attention, for the universality ofbeing is not 
merely that of a genus. Being somehow "transcends" the universality of genus. BT, 22/H3. What 
this "transcendence" amounts to is obscure, and it can only be clarified once the meaning of being is 
discovered. 
7 BT, 371/H324. 
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play a role) the glass would not be intelligible. Fundamental ontology, as an attempt to 
clarify our understanding of the meaning of being, seeks to discover what makes our 
understanding of being possible. The first step in this endeavour is to gain a 
comprehensive picture of our understanding of being by discerning how this 
understanding manifests itself in the various ways we relate to beings. Fundamental 
ontology proceeds as an analysis of human existence, as what Heidegger terms an 
"existential analytic."8 Existential analysis uncovers Existenzialen, or the ways of 
relating to beings constitutive of any human existence whatsoever.9 Once these 
Existenzialen are described, our understanding of being will be grasped more precisely, 
and Heidegger will be in a position to uncover what makes it possible. This condition of 
possibility is transcendental. That is, it lies beyond the domain of what is-it lies beyond 
the domain of beings. The meaning of being is not itself a being. Heidegger will argue 
that this transcendental ground of possibility is temporality, the nature of which will be 
explained in Chapter One. As that which makes possible the intelligibility of being 
implicit in our ways of relating to beings, temporality is the meaning of being. 
The relevance of fundamental ontology for the problem of embodiment emerges 
when one considers Heidegger's interpretation of human existence as Dasein. 10 
Heidegger takes the term "Dasein," an everyday German word for "existence," and 
8 BT, 34/Hl6. 
9 BT, 38/H17. Understanding, mood and spatiality are three of the basic ways of relating to beings that 
Heidegger will analyze. These Existenzialen will be explained in Chapter One. 
10 It should be noted that "Dasein" is not straightforwardly synonymous with "human existence." A more 
precise account of the meaning of"Dasein" will be provided in Chapter Two. 
3 
invests it with special significance by emphasizing its components, Da ("there") and Sein 
("being"). Human existence is ''there-being," which means that to be a human being is 
to be wholly constituted by one's engagement with beings, to be one's "there." As 
Dasein, human existence is not a matter of one term, a subject, entering into relations 
with other terms, or objects. Instead, to be a human being is to be these relations 
themselves.11 In other words, a human being is not a subject who, amongst other acts of 
cognition, sometimes understands the meaning of being. Instead, to be a human being 
means to be this understanding ofbeing itself. The account ofDasein presented so far is 
preliminary. Some of the Existenzialen will be explained in Chapter One, and the 
complexity of the concept ofDasein will emerge more fully in Chapter Two. But already 
one can see why the notion of Dasein seems to offer an innovative solution to the 
problem of embodiment. Under such a conception of human existence, the human body 
would be neither an object somehow attached to a transcendent subject standing outside 
of the totality of objects, nor would it be a conglomeration of objective causal 
relationships that somehow gives rise to consciousness. Both subject and object would 
be secondary moments of a prior relational structure, a structure that would somehow 
involve corporeity. 
But despite the apparent promise the concept of Dasein holds for the problem of 
embodiment, Heidegger explicitly refuses to discuss embodiment in the existential 
11 Criticizing the theory of knowledge according to which knowing involves a subject's transcending itself 
and "crossing over" to objects, Heidegger writes that "Dasein does not sort of exist and then occasionally 
achieve a crossing over outside itself, but existence originally means to cross over. Dasein is itself the 
passage across." MFL, 165. 
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analytic. 12 Heidegger does not even include embodiment as an Existenzial-a surprising 
omission, since the body, as that through which we sense and manipulate beings, would 
seem to be essential to human existence. Heidegger' s neglect of embodiment has been 
noted by such prominent philosophers as Jean-Paul Sartre, who complains that there are 
barely six lines on the body in Being and Time, and by David Farrell Krell, who wonders 
whether Dasein is "destined to share the fate of the cherubim and seraphim."13 
Emmanuel Levinas criticizes Heidegger for neglecting to consider the bodily enjoyment 
involved in our relations with beings. 14 Tina Chanter observes that it is remarkable that a 
work expounding a notion of the human being as constituted by its engagement with 
beings, and not as a subject standing over and against beings, would deny attention to 
how the body enters into this engagement. 15 But as frustrating or puzzling as Heidegger' s 
12 BT, 143/H108. 
13 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 
323; David Farrell Krell, Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1992), 52. 
14 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 
1969), 133. 
15 Tina Chanter, Time, Death and the Feminine (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 83. There is at 
least one significant voice of dissent amongst those who have looked to Being and Time for an account of 
bodily experience. In his The Body's Recollection of Being (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 
Michael Levin argues that even though Heidegger declines undertaking a thematic treatment of our bodily 
nature, he offers many insights into our bodily capacities. As examples of such capacties, Levin cites 
passages in Being and Time in which Heidegger discusses the bodily activity of hammering, the experience 
of hardness and resistance, the condition of the possibility of being physically touched by something, sight 
and hearing and their various modalities, and the sensuous character of speech. (39) 
But Levin's references prove to be disappointing. The cited discussion of the experience of hardness 
and resistance takes place in the context of Heidegger's critical discussion of Descartes' notion of 
substance. Heidegger argues that by construing the sensation of resistance in terms of the relative motion 
of things in space, Descartes completely neglects the revelatory character of sensation. BT, 130/H97. But 
Heidegger himself does not go on to offer an account of sensation or of the experience of resistance. As 
for the discussion of the possibility of being touched by something, it is just that: Heidegger here is not 
discussing affectivity proper but only its conditions of possibility. BT, 177/H137. And while Heidegger 
does mention seeing colours in the context of a discussion of the Greek conception of truth as perception, 
the phenomenon of bodily seeing is not made the theme of investigation. BT, 54/H31. The same goes for 
5 
neglect of embodiment may be, the question remains as to whether and in what sense this 
neglect constitutes a flaw in fundamental ontology. Heidegger explicitly states that he 
only carries out existential analysis to the extent required to elucidate our understanding 
of being, and that a comprehensive description of human existence is beyond the scope of 
his project. 16 Perhaps a treatment of the problem of embodiment is not required for 
Heidegger' s purposes. 
The central importance of the problem of embodiment for fundamental ontology 
is shown by Alphonse de Waelhens, who argues that Heidegger's neglect of the problem 
of embodiment renders his analysis of Dasein essentially incomplete. De Waelhens 
points out that the problem of how we can be immanent in that which we transcend must 
be addressed if the relational structure of human existence is to be made intelligible. 
Since the body is implicated in our relations with beings, and since the body participates 
in the causal order of nature, human existence is somehow constituted by the intersection 
of two orders of relations: the order of causal relations, in terms of which we are in 
nature, and the order of what one might call "meaning relations," or those relations in 
terms of which nature is constituted as a meaningful systemfor us. Putting pen to paper, 
the force my hand exerts on the page via the pen causes ink to spread; at the same time, I 
understand the pen and paper as instruments to be used for writing. De Waelhens argues 
Levin's reference to hearing and speech: Heidegger merely mentions the sensuous aspects of linguistic 
expression in the course of a discussion of the conditions of possibility of language. BT, 205/H162. 
Following up on Levin's citations reveals that he overemphasizes the significance of Heidegger's 
references to the body. In each case, one discovers that Heidegger merely mentions aspects of bodily 
experience in the context of discussions concerned with other themes. 
16 BT, 38/H17, 170/Hl31, 227/H183, 238/H194. 
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that by neglecting embodiment in the existential analytic, Heidegger proceeds as if the 
problem of how the two orders of relations can intersect were resolved.17 But as long as 
this problem is not addressed, the relational structure of human existence, and the 
understanding ofbeing operative therein, remain fundamentally opaque. 
In spite of the importance of the problem of embodiment for fundamental 
ontology, and in spite of fundamental ontology's promise of an innovative solution to this 
problem, Heidegger devotes very little attention to it. This thesis addresses the question 
of what motivates Heidegger' s neglect. I will argue that Heidegger' s neglect of the 
problem of embodiment is motivated by the peculiar difficulty it presents for fundamental 
ontology: the risk of falling into what Husser! calls "transcendental realism."18 
Transcendental realism is the idea that the transcendental structures that make possible 
the intelligibility of the real are themselves real, or that the transcendental can be located 
within the realm it renders intelligible. The mistake in this thought lies in its 
misunderstanding of the very nature of transcendental philosophy. In seeking that which 
makes possible the intelligibility of reality as such, transcendental philosophy explores a 
realm outside the domain of the real, which means that one goes fundamentally astray by 
calling "real" whatever such inquiry discovers. 19 Fundamental ontology is transcendental 
17 Alphonse de Waelhens, "A Philosophy of the Ambiguous," in Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, 
trans. Fisher, xviii. 
18 Edmund Husser!, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 24. 
19 Kant also uses the term "transcendental realism," and in basically the same sense as in Husserl. For 
Kant, transcendental realism is the idea that space and time, which as the forms of intuition belong to the 
transcendental realm, describe the structure of the in-itself. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 
trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 346,439,470. 
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philosophy: in seeking the conditions of the possibility of the intelligibility of being, it 
seeks to comprehend something that lies beyond the domain of all that is. Formulated in 
terms of fundamental ontology, transcendental realism is the mistake one makes in 
thinking that the meaning of being, the transcendental condition of possibility ofbeing's 
intelligibility, can itself be situated in the domain of beings. This thesis will account for 
Heidegger' s surprising neglect of embodiment by showing that it is difficult to offer a 
satisfactory account ofDasein's embodiment without falling into this error. 
For the purposes of this thesis, "fundamental ontology" covers Heidegger's work 
between 1924 and 1930, a period in which he pursues existential analysis as the best way 
to uncover the meaning of being.20 The thesis is comprised of three chapters. Chapter 
One formulates the problem of embodiment in terms ofHeidegger's ontological concepts. 
Chapter Two examines and ultimately rejects the possibility that Heidegger's concept of 
Dasein allows fundamental ontology to evade the problem of embodiment. It thereby 
secures de Waelhens' demonstration of the central importance and inevitability of this 
problem in the pursuit of the meaning of being. Chapter Three examines the viability of 
some basic approaches to the problem of embodiment for fundamental ontology, showing 
the inadequacy of a purely naturalistic or a purely transcendental approach. Fundamental 
ontology demands an approach to the problem that avoids both extremes while also 
20 The chronology of these works runs as follows: CT(Lecture, 1924), HCT(Lecture Course, 1925), BT 
(Manuscript published 1927), BPP (Lecture Course, 1927), KPM (Manuscipt published 1929), FCM 
(Lecture course, 1929/30), WM (Lecture, 1930). 
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avoiding transcendental realism-a difficult challenge. The thesis concludes by raising 
the question of whether this challenge can be met by the approach to embodiment 
sketched by Heidegger in the recently published Zollikon Seminars, a series of seminars 
led by Heidegger in the 1960s. 
9 
Chapter One 
The Heideggerian Version of the Problem of Embodiment 
1.1 Introduction 
In section 23 of Being and Time, Heidegger acknowledges that Dasein's '"bodily 
nature' (Leiblichkeit) hides (birgt) a whole problematic of its own" but excuses himself 
from taking it up as a theme of investigation, writing that ''we shall not treat it here."21 In 
this passage, not only does Heidegger announce his intention to pass over the 
phenomenon of Dasein's corporeity, but he also leaves unclarified the precise nature of 
the problem sheltered therein. The reader is thus left with the question of what this 
problem amounts to. Alphonse de Waelhens has articulated it in a general way as a 
central enigma of human existence: how a being can be within the world that it 
constitutes for itself. The task of this chapter is to articulate this problem, the basic 
problem of embodiment, in terms ofHeidegger's ontological categories. I will show that 
the problematic concealed in Dasein's bodily nature is the problem of how to conceive of 
the intersection of extantness (Vorhandenheit) and ek-sistence (Existenz) in the human 
body.22 
21 BT, 143/H108. 
22 Heidegger's term Vorhandenheit is variously translated. Macquarrie and Robinson render it as 
"presence-at-hand" in BT, and Joan Stambaugh renders it as "objective presence" in her translation of the 
same work. Albert Hofstadter often opts for "extantness" in BPP, as does Michael Heim in MFL. In this 
thesis, I employ both "extantness" and "presence-at-hand" as translations of Vorhandenheit in order to 
distinguish between two senses of this term. I use "extantness" to translate Vorhandenheit when it is used 
in the broad sense of describing all beings other than Dasein, and "presence-at-hand" when Vorhandenheit 
is used in the narrower sense of designating a way in which beings are encountered by Dasein. Support for 
distinguishing between a broad and narrower sense of Vorhandenheit is found in BT. In the context of a 
discussion of how Dasein's ontological characteristics (Existentialia) are to be sharply distinguished from 
the ontological characteristics of beings without the character of Dasein (categories), Heidegger writes, 
10 
The articulation of this problem proceeds in three stages. First, I explain 
Heidegger's concepts of extantness and ek-sistence. After noting that Heidegger does not 
include the body as an Existenzial, or as an essential structure of ek-sistence, I proceed 
with the second stage, an investigation of the adequacy of the concepts of presence-at-
hand (Vorhandenheit) and readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit), the two primary modes in 
which extant beings are encountered in ek-sistence, as ways of conceiving of the human 
body. Drawing on some insights of Merleau-Ponty, I conclude that neither concept 
adequately describes the phenomenon of human embodiment on account of the body's 
constitutive role in ek-sistence. However, the fact that the human body can be conceived 
in terms of presence-at-hand or readiness-to-hand indicates its immanence in the realm of 
the extant. Stated in terms of Heidegger's ontological categories, the problem of 
embodiment is how to conceive of the intersection of ek-sistence and extantness in the 
human body. In the third and final stage of the chapter, I distinguish the problem of 
embodiment from three other problems implicit in Dasein's corporeity. 
1.2 Ek-sistence and Extantness 
Ek-sistence can be defined as the mode ofbeing ofbeings who, in their concern 
for their own being, constitute time. Extantness is the mode of being of beings which, 
unconcerned about their own being, enter into time. 23 These preliminary definitions 
"Existentialia and categories are the two basic possibilities for characters of Being. The entities which 
correspond to them require different kinds of primary interrogation respectively: any entity is either a 
"who" (existence) or a "what" (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense)." BT, 71/H45. "Extantness," with 
its connotation of something's being "out there" or "around" and available for Dasein to encounter in 
different ways, captures the broader sense of Vorhandenheit well. 
23 CT, 3, 20. 
11 
require elaboration. Because Heidegger's concepts of ek-sistence and extantness are 
essentially bound up with each other and with his concept of temporality, none of the 
three concepts can be adequately explained in isolation from the other two. Temporality 
is the meaning or the ontological condition of the possibility of ek-sistence. Extantness is 
the ontic condition of the possibility of ek-sistence; that is, it makes ek-sistence possible 
not by constituting its structure, but by furnishing that out of which and onto which ek-
sistence (and therefore temporality) operates. These initial remarks will be clarified in 
this section in three stages. First, I provide an initial account of ek-sistence as care 
(Sorge). Second, I elucidate two key aspects of care, understanding and attunement. In 
the third and final stage, I turn to an exposition of the temporality manifested in care and 
explain the concepts of ek-sistence and extantness in their full temporal significance. 
1.2.1 Ek-sistence as Care 
Ek-sistence is the mode of being of beings for whom their own being is an issue. 
This self-concern reveals itself in big questions-What will I do with my life? Will we 
humans end up destroying ourselves?-as well as in small-Is there enough gas in the car 
for our trip tomorrow? Will I get to the meeting on time? The use of the future tense in 
these questions indicates the essentially temporal nature of self-concern: to be concerned 
about one's own being is to encounter beings in terms of their relevance for one's future. 
In their concern with the future, self-concerned beings project themselves beyond the 
present. Heidegger reserves the term "ek-sistence" (Existenz) to describe the mode of 
12 
being of self-concerned beings; all other beings are extant (vorhanden). 24 Trees, rocks 
and houses do not ek-sist; as extant beings, they are beings for which their own being is 
not an issue. 25 
In its concern for its own being, the ek-sisting being is constantly occupied with 
other ek-sisting beings and with the extant beings it encounters in the world, thereby 
forming a web of relations that Heidegger calls "being-in-the-world" (/n-der-Welt-Sein). 
The use of a hyphenated compound to describe the system of relations established in ek-
sistence indicates that the being of the ek-sisting being is inseparable from its relating 
itself to a world. The ek-sisting being is not to be construed as a subject that could in 
principle have its being independently of the world, or as a being for which perception is 
a matter of transcending an inner realm in order to access external objects.26 To 
understand the ek-sisting being in such a way is to understand it as a "what" or as 
something extant, when the ek-sisting being can only be properly understood as a "how," 
that is, in terms of its ways of relating to beings.27 After describing , in the first five 
chapters of Division One of Being and Time, the essential ways of relating to beings that 
24 I follow the convention of translating Existenz as "ek-sistence" rather than as "existence" because of the 
former term's capacity to capture the temporal essence of self-concern through its evocation of the Greek 
term ekstatikon ( "stepping-outside-self'). Heidegger points out the connection between Existenz and 
ekstatikon in BT, 377/H329 and in BPP, 267. 
2~ Heidegger maintains that beings that are merely alive do not ek-sist, since their responsiveness to the 
beings that surround them does not spring from a self-concern that discloses them as beings, i.e. in terms of 
an understanding of being, but from instinctive striving. FCM, 259. Heidegger's concept of life and its 
relevance for the problem of embodiment will be discussed in section 1.4. 
26 MFL, 165/H210-211. 
27 BT, 67/H42; CT, 12-13. In response to thinkers such as Husserl and Scheler who insist that the subject is 
not to be understood as a thing, Heidegger asserts that as long as the being of this subject is not clearly 
distinguished from extantness, the interpretation of the human being as a subject fundamentally remains an 
idea of the human being as something extant. BT, 73/H47-48. 
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make up the phenomenon of being-in-the-world, Heidegger in Chapter Six discerns their 
common meaning in the phenomenon of care (Sorge), thereby articulating self-concern as 
a formal ontological concept. Heidegger defines care as "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-
in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)."28 To be 
constituted by care means to find oneself already relating to the beings one presently 
finds alongside of oneself in terms of concern for one's future.29 The revelation of 
temporality as the condition of the possibility of care is clearly foreshadowed in this 
definition. I will elucidate ek-sistence and the temporality it manifests by explaining how 
the phenomenon of understanding embodies the "ahead-of-itself," that of attunement the 
"already-in," and their unity the "along-side." 
1.2.2 Understanding and Attunement 
Heidegger conceives of understanding (Verstehen) primarily in the sense of 
"being able to manage something," "being a match for it," or "being competent to do 
something" and not in the sense of cognition.30 We say that someone is competent in an 
activity when he engages with the beings in question in terms of a familiarity with how 
these beings are appropriately handled. Thus a competent pilot is someone who deals 
28 BT, 237/H192. 
29 It is on account of the dynamic, temporal nature of care that a defmition of being-in-the-world as a 
complex in which relations exhaustively defme their terms can be misleading. Such a defmition, while 
capturing the notion of ek-sistence as a "how" rather than as a "what," tends to misrepresent being-in-the-
world as a static phenomenon on account of the mathematical and logical senses of the concept of relation. 
Heidegger is recorded as saying, "I myself am the relationship [Beziehung] to something or to someone 
with whom I am involved in each case. However, "relationship" is not to be understood here in the 
modem logical-mathematical sense of relation... Its basic essence is one's being concerned and letting 
oneselfbe concerned .... " ZS, 185. 
30 BT, 183/H143. 
14 
with the controls in terms of his familiarity with using them to fly planes. As an 
ontological term, that is, as a term describing an essential structure of ek-sistence, 
"understanding" does not refer to competence in this or that particular task, but to 
competence in ek-sisting as such.31 Just as the pilot manages flying by engaging with the 
controls in terms of his previously acquired familiarity with flying planes, so the ek-
sisting being "manages" ek-sistence in terms of an implicit "familiarity" with beings as 
pertaining to its self-concern. All ontic understanding, including the cognition ofbeings, 
is made possible by this basic ontological competence.32 
A closer examination of what is involved in competence reveals the phenomenon 
of projection (Entwerfen), thereby providing insight into how temporality is manifested in 
understanding. Projection is the ontological phenomenon that makes possible the ek-
sisting being's reckoning with the future. Once again we can elucidate an ontological 
phenomenon by beginning with one of its ontic instantiations. When the pilot reaches for 
the joystick, he has an expectation of how the airplane will respond to its manipulation. 
In his competence, he runs ahead of himself; he projects the joystick onto the expectation 
that lies before him in thought.l3 
31 Ibid. 
32 Heidegger argues that the theoretical comprehension of beings derives from practical activity. His 
conception of how this is so will be discussed in the next section, in the context of a discussion of his 
concepts of presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand. 
33 The pilot thereby encounters the joystick as meaningfUl. Heidegger's initial defmition of meaning in 
Being and Time is '"the upon which' of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as 
something .... " BT, 193/H151. The activity of flying a plane, as that upon which the pilot projects the 
controls, constitutes their meaning. Heidegger's definition of meaning in Division II, section 65, cited in 
the Introduction, follows naturally from the initial definition. As that upon which the joystick is projected, 
the activity of flying is the condition of the possibility of the joystick's intelligibility. 
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More precisely, the pilot projects the joystick onto his own possibility of flying a 
plane, where "possibility" refers neither to what is logically possible for the pilot nor to 
what may contingently befall the pilot, but to a way of being he is in the process of 
undertaking. While it is logically possible that I could become prime minister, and while I 
may fall victim to the contingent possibility of becoming ill, the possibilities proper to me 
as an ek-sisting being are solely those ways of being I actively undertake.34 Thus being 
prime minister is a possibility for me only to the extent that I have dedicated myself to 
this goal and am taking steps to attain it. lfl merely note that it is not inconceivable that I 
should one day become prime minister, or if I make my becoming prime minister the 
object of idle daydreaming, becoming prime minister ceases to be one of my 
possibilities.35 In its self-concern, the ek-sisting being always already finds itself living 
out possible ways of being and is continually pushing forward into further possible ways 
for it to be. Ek-sisting beings are nothing over and above their possibilities; to ek-sist 
means that one is what one can be. This apparent identification of actuality and 
possibility is nonsensical only if we think of a human being as something extant. 
Whereas what is possible for an extant being pertains to it as a contingent property, what 
is possible for an ek-sisting being is that in terms of which it is projecting itself into the 
future. Since the essence of ek-sistence is temporalizing, the ek-sisting being is 
constituted by its projection, entailing that it is what it can be. The standing-outside-self 
of temporality constitutes each individual human being, resulting in the fact that 
34 BT, 183/H143. 
35 BT, 185/H145. 
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individual human beings are their possibilities. Whereas for extant beings, actuality takes 
precedence over possibility, the converse holds true for ek-sisting beings.36 
All ontic projection onto one's own possibilities involves the ontological 
projection ofbeing upon beings: presupposed in the pilot's understanding of the joystick 
is an understanding that the joystick is, though the precise meaning of this "is" is 
enigmatic. Heidegger writes that the "understanding of Being has already been taken for 
granted in projecting upon possibilities. In projection, Being is understood, though not 
ontologically conceived."37 Beings are disclosed (erschlossen) as beings in the light of 
the ek-sisting being's projection of being. The essence or meaning of this projection of 
being is the temporal dimension of the future. The dimension of the future thus manifests 
itself, via the understanding of being, in all ontic projection. Though phenomena more 
explicitly geared towards the future such as planning, worrying and gambling manifest 
the futural dimension especially clearly, all human comportment towards beings 
embodies the futural dimension of ek-sistence.38 
Ek-sistence manifests the temporal dimension of the past, or of having-been 
( Gewesenheit) in the phenomenon of attunement. "Attunement" is a translation of 
Heidegger's term Befindlichkeit, a play on the German expression "Wie befinden Sie 
36 BT, 183/H144. 
37 BT, 187/H147. 
38 Even comportment that at flrst glance seems geared wholly towards the past manifests futurity. For 
instance, when I remember a past experience, the content of my memory is meaningful only insofar as it is 
tacitly projected upon one of my own possibilities. In other words, my memories gain their significance 
from an understanding of who I am and where I am going. 
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sich?" which means "How do you find yourself?" or, more simply, "How are you?"39 
Every encounter with beings involves finding oneself amongst them in a certain way, e.g. 
in an indifferent, light-hearted, or fearful mood (Stimmung). Attunement is the 
ontological structure of ek-sistence that makes moods possible.40 Whereas understanding 
discloses beings as things to be employed for the sake of the ek-sisting being's 
possibilities, attunement discloses how beings matter to the ek-sisting being as well as the 
range of possibilities open to it.41 For example, a rain shower "matters" in the mode of 
undesirability when it annuls one's plans to go to the ballgame. Thus thrown into a 
grumpy, unresponsive mood, the possibilities offered by the people and things nearest 
one go largely ignored. Attunement, in disclosing how one is, also discloses that one is. 
Moods bring the ek-sisting being before its ''that it is and has to be" or before the bare, 
inexplicable facticity of its ek-sistence.42 Finding itself thrown (geworfen) into 
circumstances upon which it projects its possibilities, the ek-sisting being cannot recall 
ever having chosen to ek-sist, nor could it-the bare fact of existence, as the ground of all 
possibilities, itself can never be a possibility upon which one could project oneself. The 
projection of any possibility presupposes that one already ek-sists. The temporal 
39 Macquarrie and Robinson translate Befindlichkeit as "state of mind." I prefer Stambaugh's "attunement" 
because it better captures the impersonal nature of Befindlichkeit. "State of mind" misleads one into 
conceiving of Befindlichkeit in terms of individual minds, which, as will be shown in the next chapter, is 
not Heidegger's intention. 
40 One might well ask if it is not rather human sensibility that makes moods possible. Heidegger's response 
is that it is only possible for sensibility to disclose beings as imbued with an emotional tenor or to disclose 
Dasein as thrown if sensibility is determined by the a priori structure of attunement. BT, 177/H 13 7. More 
on this in Chapter Two. 
41 BT, 175, 176/H136, 137. 
42 BT, 174/H135. 
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dimension of the past manifests itself in this uncanny experience of finding oneself in the 
midst of a life already underway. 
Attunement and understanding, as aspects of the single phenomenon of care, are 
essentially unified: attunement always has its understanding, and understanding is always 
attuned.43 Together, understanding and attunement disclose the present situation of the 
ek-sisting being. At present I am sitting in front of my computer, mentally drained. 
Understanding discloses my computer as a writing instrument; attunement discloses my 
fatigue, my own facticity, my computer as tiresome, and a definite range of possibilities 
that includes continuing to write or taking a break. My present situation is thus disclosed: 
finding myself doggedly writing a thesis, I can continue to project the computer upon the 
possibility of writing, or I can project the television set upon the possibility of taking a 
break.44 This disclosure of the present through the unity of the future and of having-been 
in ek-sistence manifests primordial temporality, the exposition of which will allow us to 
grasp ek-sistence and extantness more profoundly. 
1.2.3 Ek-sistence and Extantness in the Light of Temporality 
Thus far ek-sistence has been explained as attuned, understanding self-concern. 
The temporal essence of ek-sistence already indicated in the discussion so far can now be 
made explicit. Heidegger articulates his concept of temporality in contrast to what he 
43 BT, 182/H142-143. 
44 While such concrete, ontic situations can be used to clearly illustrate how ontological structures 
condition our possible ways of dealing with beings, it should be borne in mind that these same structures 
also condition possible ways of understanding being. For Heidegger, the aim of philosophy is not merely 
to discover the conditions of the possibility for our dealings with beings, but to elicit a transformation in 
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calls the ordinary (vulgar) notion of time. According to this ordinary notion, time is 
understood "as a succession, as a 'flowing stream' of 'nows"' without beginning or end.45 
Under this conception of time, only the present can properly be said to exist. Saint 
Augustine expresses the notion of the primacy of the present in his famous meditation on 
time: "If the future and past do exist, I want to know where they are.... For if, wherever 
they are, they are future, they do not yet exist; if past, they no longer exist. So wherever 
they are and whatever they are, it is only by being present that they are."46 For the 
ordinary understanding, the "now" arises from the nothingness of the not-yet into the 
being of the present, only to vanish into the nothingness of the no-longer, making way for 
the next "now." Such a conception oftime betrays an ontological bias towards presence 
in two ways: the "now" is both the ever-present window through which the succession of 
"nows" passes, and the momentarily present "now" that passes through this window. In 
both senses, time is implicitly thought as something that is somehow present in the way 
that objects are present for a subject. 47 
Heidegger argues that the ordinary notion of time conceals a primordial 
temporality from which it is derived.48 Temporality is neither a succession of beings 
("nows") nor a being (the ''window") through which these beings pass. Temporality, as 
that in terms of which not only beings, but being itself, is understood, "is" not a being. 
our understanding of being. In other words, Heidegger's ultimate concern is with ontological possibility, 
and not merely with the ontic variety. 
45 BT, 474/H422. 
46 Augustine, Confessions, trans. R.S. Pine-Coffin (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), 271. 
47 BT, 475/H423. 
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Here Heidegger runs into the same linguistic difficulty encountered in discussing being, 
namely the need to use the verb "to be" to describe what makes the use of this verb 
possible. He writes, "Temporality 'is' not an entity [a being] at all. It is not, but it 
temporalizes itself [zeitigt sich]."49 Temporalizing "is" a singular event in which future, 
present and past differentiate themselves from one another while maintaining an inner 
unity. In differentiating itself into future, present and past, temporality is constituted by 
an ekstatikon, a stepping-outside-self.50 With this Greek term in mind, Heidegger calls 
the phenomena of the past, present and future the "ecstases" (Ekstasen) of temporality.51 
In this process, the ecstasis of the future, and not that of the present, is primary. As 
manifested in the unity of understanding and attunement, temporalizing gives birth to the 
present when, in the inner unity of temporalizing, the futural ecstasis is drawn back 
towards the ecstasis of "having-been" (Gewesenheit). 52 Heidegger's analysis of 
temporality strips presence of its ontological priority, not by asserting that the future or 
the past are, but by uncovering a futural, ecstatic temporality that, properly speaking, is 
not, but in terms of which being is understood. 
The ordinary understanding's failure to distinguish ek-sistence as a distinct mode 
of being stems from the same ontological bias towards presence that is behind its failure 
to see the phenomenon of primordial temporality. Failing to see the phenomenon of ek-
48 Since a discussion of how primordial temporality generates the ordinary conception of time is not 
required in order to explain the concepts of ek-sistence and extantness, I will forego such a discussion here. 
The interested reader is referred to Section 81 of Being and Time. 
49 BT, 377/H328. 
50 BPP, 267. Cf. also BT, 377/H329. 
51 BT, 377/H329. 
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sistence, the ordinary understanding conceives of all beings as extant. Vorhandenheit, like 
Existenz, has a temporal connotation: extant beings are present, and in two senses. Taken 
in themselves, extant beings are present in the sense that, unconcerned with their own 
being, they do not ecstatically project themselves upon a future. The presence of extant 
beings taken in themselves is wholly negative: lacking a temporal horizon, extant beings 
are atemporal. 53 
The presence of extant beings takes on a positive sense when they are considered 
in their relation to ek-sistence. In its self-concern, the ek-sisting being projects these 
beings onto its own ecstatic temporal horizon, thereby making them present to itself. The 
ordinary understanding, having missed the phenomenon of primordial temporality, 
interprets the presence of extant beings as their momentary appearance in the present. 
Extant beings are interpreted as being ''within" time: having made their brief appearance 
in the "now" segment of the timeline, they move further along into the obscurity of the 
past. Since ek-sistence is the manifestation of ecstatic temporality, a failure to see the 
latter phenomenon entails a failure to see the former. Thus ek-sisting beings are also 
interpreted as being present in the same way: they, like all beings, pass through time. As 
for the ek-sisting being's awareness of a temporal horizon, it is interpreted as something 
"subjective." The temporal horizon is the subject's perspective on the real, objective time 
through which it passes. The uniform interpretation of the relation between beings and 
time as one of ''within-time-ness" (lnnerzeitigkeit) entails the uniform interpretation of 
52 BT, 374/H326. 
53 BT, 472/H420. 
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being as extantness. Ek-sisting beings are reduced to the level of extantness by 
interpreting them as present both in the sense of having being only insofar as they appear 
in the "now," and in the sense of atemporality-not by denying that they are temporal, 
but by denying that their temporality constitutes their essence. 
1.3 The Inadequacy of the Concepts of Presence-at-Hand and Readiness-to-Hand as 
Descriptions of Bodily Experience 
Given that Heidegger does not count corporeity as an essential structure of ek-
sistence in Being and Time, it would seem that the body must be conceived as something 
extant. The body would be one more being, albeit a privileged one, that the ek-sisting 
being projects onto its own possibilities. One is inclined to reject such a notion from the 
outset since it might imply some sort of dualism, an implication seemingly at odds with 
the anti -Cartesian import of Heidegger' s philosophy. 54 But before raising the question of 
whether and in what sense fundamental ontology entails mind/body dualism, one must 
first understand the precise nature of the problem to which dualism would be a response. 
In this section I will show that the concept of extantness cannot adequately describe the 
phenomenon of embodiment. The body is not only encountered as something exterior to 
the ek-sisting being, but as constitutive of ek-sistence itsel£ This means that the problem 
of embodiment in Heidegger is not a problem of how the ek-sisting being projects itself 
upon its body as something wholly extant, but is rather the problem of how ek-sistence 
and extantness converge in the human body itself. This section proceeds first by 
54 David Cerbone, "Heidegger and Dasein's 'Bodily Nature': What is the Hidden Problematic?" 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8, no. 2 (2000): 217. 
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explaining Heidegger's concepts of presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand as the 
primary modes in which extant beings are encountered, and then by demonstrating the 
inadequacy of these concepts as descriptions ofbodily experience. 
Heidegger identifies two main modes in which extant beings are encountered in 
ek-sistence: presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand.55 Beings are encountered as ready-
to-hand when they are understood as having a practical function. To return to the 
example of the pilot: when he encounters the joystick as something to be used for flying, 
he encounters it as something ready-to-hand. Ready-to-hand beings are always 
encountered in terms of a network of references grounded in a goal. The primary 
relationships that make up this network are the "in-order-to" (das Um-zu), a being's 
immediate purpose within an activity, the "towards-which" (das Wozu), the intended 
product of an activity, be it a manufactured thing or a state of affairs, and the "for-the-
sake-of-which" (das Um-willen), the existential possibility for which the activity is 
undertaken. 56 The pilot understands the joystick as being in order to manoeuvre, 
manoeuvring is undertaken towards the goal of reaching a destination, and flying, with its 
complex network of references, is undertaken for the sake of being a pilot. Taken in 
isolation from other things, a being can never be ready-to-hand. As something for flying, 
the joystick is only functional insofar as it refers to other instruments and mechanical 
parts with which it forms a system (the ''with-which," das Wobei). 57 Because everyday 
55 Heidegger also mentions life, language and space as exhibiting ambiguous modes of being that fall 
outside of ek-sistence, presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand. BT, 751H50, 209/H166, 147/Hll2. 
56 BT, 98-101/H69-72. 
57 BT, 117/H85. 
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ek-sistence is a primarily a matter of making use of beings (doorknobs, stairs, and so on), 
readiness-to-hand is the basic mode in which beings are encountered. 
Beings are encountered as present-at-hand when they are encountered without 
regard to their involvement in the referential totality constitutive of practical activity, thus 
revealing the properties they possess independently of the use we make of them. 58 Since, 
for Heidegger, the ek-sisting being is originally and for the most part oriented towards 
other beings in a practical mode, the encounter with beings as present-at-hand is 
derivative upon encountering them as ready-to-hand-beings emerge as present-at-hand 
when something goes wrong in practical activity. When, for example, a tool breaks, goes 
missing, or gets in the way, it emerges from its embeddedness in a referential system and 
emerges as a naked thing, as something that is stubbornly "just there."59 When we 
examine beings theoretically, we encounter them as present-at-hand, though encountering 
one being as present-at-hand often requires engaging with others as ready-to-hand. 
Ascertaining the nature of something present-at-hand underneath the microscope involves 
dealing with ready-to-hand beings such as the microscope, slides, saline, and so forth. 60 
Neither readiness-to-hand nor presence-at-hand are appropriate categories for 
describing the body's role in ek-sisting. Conceived as something present-at-hand, my 
own body would be encountered as the one object in my perceptual field that remains 
58 BT, 101/H71. 
59 BT, 102-103/H73-74. 
60 It is perhaps in ontology, beginning as it does with thaumazein, "observing entities and marvelling at 
them"" and in which we step back from beings and behold them in their totality, that we experience our 
most radical break with beings as ready-to-hand. BT, 216/H172. In its purely theoretical attitude, ontology 
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with me throughout all the changes of my location. On the surface, such a description of 
the body seems plausible, since it is undeniable that whereas things come and go 
throughout the flux of experience, my body remains with me throughout. But a closer 
examination of the body's constant presence reveals that this presence is of a 
fundamentally different kind than that of beings present-at-hand. Whereas present-at-
hand beings continually emerge into presence and fall back into absence, the body 
functions as what Maurice Merleau-Ponty calls the "primordial field" by which beings 
become present.61 The position of my body determines the perspective in which beings 
are present to me; with bodily motion new perspectives unfold; the range and clarity in 
which beings can become present to me depends on the strength of the body's powers of 
perception. Merleau-Ponty calls the body, as that by which objects are given to me, the 
"lived body" (le corps vecu) in distinction from the body taken as an object amongst 
others, which he calls the "objective body" (le corps objectif). The objective body is 
itself one of the objects given on the basis of the lived body. We experience this vividly 
in the phenomenon of "double sensation": grasping my right arm with my left hand, I 
experience my arm as an object of perception and my hand as that through which I 
perceive, or alternately, my hand as an object of perception and my arm as that through 
tends to miss the phenomenon of readiness-to-hand, since beings are ready-to-hand precisely insofar as 
they withdraw from theoretical view. BT, 99/H69. 
61 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1962), 92. 
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which I perceive.62 As long as one takes the body as something present-at-hand and 
nothing more, one fails to see the body as the primordial field in terms of which beings 
appear as present-at-hand.63 
The category of readiness-to-hand seems a more promising way to describe the 
ek-sisting being's relation to its body, and for three reasons. First, one could construe the 
body as a ready-to-hand being insofar as it takes its place alongside of other ready-to-
hand beings in a referential totality.64 When I reach for a glass of wine, I understand my 
arm as something to be used in order to reach for things, reaching is undertaken towards 
the goal of taking a sip, and my reaching is undertaken for the sake of my being a wine 
connOisseur. As a (very versatile) item of equipment, my arm would inhere in the 
practical system that includes the corkscrew, the cork, the bottle, and so on. Second, one 
could construe the body as constituting a referential totality of its own.65 A hand can only 
function as a hand insofar as it belongs to an arm, an arm insofar as it is connected to a 
torso, and so on. Third, the body, like a tool, is inconspicuous when it functions 
62 The term "double sensation" is slightly misleading here. At any given moment, one can either be aware 
of one's own body as the object or as the channel of perception, but never as both. There is no double 
sensation in a single moment; the double sensation is constituted by alternating the object of attention from 
moment to moment. Merleau-Ponty, 93. 
63 Whereas beings that are present-at-hand are always potentially absent, it is perhaps the case that, as 
Merleau-Ponty claims, the absence of one's own lived body is inconceivable. Merleau-Ponty, 91. When 
one imagines or dreams that one perceives beings without oneself being perceived, as in the fantasy of 
being invisible, the lived body is still implicated, insofar as such fantasies still involve finding oneself 
situated in the midst of beings, sensing and engaging with them in terms of a medium intimately present to 
oneself. The invisible or permeable body is simply a body with fantastic powers. To attempt to imagine 
oneself as completely disembodied is to attempt to imagine oneself as free of perspective. Were it possible 
to imagine this vividly, one would catch a glimpse of what it is like to be God, who, as a completely self-
coincident being that immediately intuits the totality of beings in an eternal now, does not ek-sist. The 
absence of one's own body and one's being in a mode other than that of ek-sisting are conceivable to the 
same degree. 
64 Cerbone, 218. 
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smoothly. The pilot uses his hands as easily and unreflectively as he handles the radio, 
and, like a radio, his hand only emerges as something stubbornly present-at-hand when it 
goes missing (falls asleep), gets in the way (as it did when he was a clumsy adolescent) or 
breaks (gets injured). 
Considering each of these three reasons in turn reveals the inadequacy of the 
category of readiness-to-hand as a description ofthe lived body. The first reason fails to 
take into account an essential difference between my own body and a tool: whereas a tool 
can be employed by anyone, my body is solely mine. A hammer can be used in the same 
way by anyone who chances to come across it, but the way I use my arm and the way 
someone else might use it are essentially distinct. Whereas I move my own arm directly, 
without requiring any intermediate device for doing so, I can only move someone else's 
arm indirectly, via my own body.66 The parts of my body, unlike the tools that surround 
me, are incorporated into myself. Heidegger states that it belongs to the essence of 
equipment not to be so incorporated; the public availability of something for a definite 
purpose-its "readiness" (Fertigkeit)-is an essential aspect of equipment.67 The body, 
as I live it, is not publicly available for use and is not ready-to-hand. 
The second reason for the readiness-to-hand of the body fails because it draws a 
false distinction between the lived body and the world. I experience my own body and 
the publicly accessible world as facets of a single system.68 Merleau-Ponty writes, 
65 Ibid. 
66 Cerbone, 220. 
67 FCM, 220. 
68 Merleau-Ponty, 106. 
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"Every external perception is immediately synonymous with a certain perception of my 
body, just as every perception of my body is made explicit in the language of external 
perception."69 When I lean over a table with the intention of grasping a glass of water, 
the glass momentarily forms the focal point of my world, and my lived body, falling into 
line behind my intention, is experienced as trailing behind the outward movement of my 
hand. Although the degree to which the lived body or the world dominates one's 
attention constantly fluctuates, one is rarely, if ever, experienced in complete 
independence from the other. Further, in those cases in which the lived body dominates to 
a high degree, such as in a case of intense pain, one experiences the formlessness of the 
lived body taken in itself. In a pain so extreme as to block out all awareness of the 
external world, consciousness is dissolved into an amorphous mass. It is only with the 
alleviation of the pain and the re-emergence of consciousness of my being situated in a 
world that the structure of my own body re-asserts itself. Lacking structure in isolation, 
the lived body cannot constitute a referential totality of its own. 
The third reason for the readiness-to-hand of the body involves drawing an 
unwarranted conclusion from a true premise. While it is true that the smoothly 
functioning body is inconspicuous, this fact does not provide a sufficient basis for 
classifying the body solely as a ready-to-hand extant being. The inconspicuousness of the 
body is not that of a good tool, but that of the horizon in terms of which beings emerge 
both as tools and as objects of contemplation. The lived body is like "the darkness 
69 Merleau-Ponty, 206. 
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needed in the theatre to show up the performance"; like any good backdrop, it escapes 
attention in its function as that by which beings are presented for attention.70 To infer 
from the body's inconspicuousness that it is a ready-to-hand being is to fail to consider 
the unique nature of this inconspicuousness.71 
1.4 The Intersection of Ek-sistence and Extantness in the Human Body and Other 
Problems Pertaining to Dasein's Corporeity 
The upshot of all of the above arguments against the concepts of presence-at-hand 
and readiness-to-hand as adequate descriptions of our bodily experience is that the body 
is not something incidental to ek-sistence, but partially constitutive of it.72 Nevertheless, 
it is clear that neither concept is completely inadequate as a description of the human 
body since we encounter the body as something extant in both modes all the time. It is on 
the basis of its present-at-hand dimension that the ek-sisting being can be made the object 
of the natural and social sciences. And, though it requires violence to do so, the body can 
certainly be approached as something ready-to-hand, as slavery and other forms of 
subjugation demonstrate. 73 The human body can be encountered as present-at-hand and 
70 Merleau-Ponty, 100. 
71 Brian Bowles argues that the body should not be conceived as something ready-to-hand because this 
would entail that the body properly is as long as we do not pay attention to it, with the result that "falling 
into ditches, tripping over obstacles, and getting hit by things in the world would be the norm for human 
existence, which is obviously an absurdity." Bowles, "Heidegger and the Absence of Body: The Zollikoner 
Seminare," International Studies in Philosophy 33, no. 2 (2001): 6. The problem with this argument is that 
it assumes that the readiness-to-hand of a being entails not paying attention to it. But to engage with a 
being as ready-to-hand is to be oblivious not to the being itself, but to its present-at-hand properties, and 
both hammers and the body function well insofar as they do not emerge as present-at-hand. 
72 The body's status as a constitutive element in ek-sistence accounts for the peculiar, unarticulated 
ubiquity of the body in the existential analytic, a ubiquity noted by Bowles (3). 
73 The body is also encountered as ready-to-hand in the much more benign context of gesturing. David 
Cerbone rightly argues that approaching the other's body as something present-at-hand conceals the 
gestural character of its movements. Approached wholly as something present-at-hand, the waving arm of 
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as ready-to-hand because it is extant; neither category is sufficient as a description of the 
body because it is integrated into ek-sistence. Ek-sistence and extantness somehow 
intersect in the human body-rendering this intersection intelligible is the Heideggerian 
version of the problem of embodiment. 
The problem of embodiment is not the only problem sheltered in Dasein's bodily 
nature. The corporeity of Dasein means not only that the ek-sisting being is extant, but 
also that it is alive. For Heidegger, ek-sistence and life are distinct modes of being. 
Whereas ek-sisting beings project beings upon possible ways of being, thereby 
understanding them as beings, merely living beings are constituted by a collection of 
drives that are automatically activated by coming into contact with the appropriate 
stimuli.74 Whereas a flower instinctively reacts to the sun as the occasion for blooming, 
human beings understand the sun as the herald of a new day of work, as the eye of the 
god Varuna, or as a ball ofburning gas. Only human beings encounter the sun in terms of 
these economic, religious or scientific possibilities. Given Heidegger' s strict distinction 
between ek-sistence and life, and given the fact that embodied, ek-sisting beings are 
subject to instinctual drives and biological processes, the problem arises as to how life 
another person could be understood as traversing a certain path through space at a defmite velocity, but the 
significance of this motion as a wave or as an attempt to hail a cab would be missed. Cerbone, 217. What 
Cerbone does not note is that this argument, while demonstrating that the other's body is not encountered 
as something present-at-hand in everyday life, indicates that the gesturing body is rather encountered as 
something ready-to-hand. How the understanding of gestures involves approaching the other's body as 
something present-at-hand is shown by considering gestures that provide direction. When the other directs 
my attention to an object by pointing at it, his arm functions as a sign, that is, as a ready-to-hand being 
whose function in a referential totality is to make the totality of references explicit so that one can fmd 
one's way about in it. BT, 110/HSO. 
74 FCM, 259. 
31 
and ek-sistence are related in the living, ek-sisting being.75 
Some commentators argue that this problem is the only one sheltered in Dasein's 
bodily nature. In his study of the concept of life in Heidegger's thought, David Farrell 
Krell asserts that "the only real problem with the body of Dasein is that it is alive. "76 
David Cerbone makes the same claim when he identifies the problem hinted at in section 
23 of Being and Time as that of sorting out ''what features of our embodiment mark our 
kinship with the beast, as opposed to what in or about our bodies is 'essentially other' 
than animal."77 If Cerbone and Krell are right in their claims that the problem of the 
intersection of ek-sistence and life in the human body is the problem posed by Dasein's 
corporeity, then my formulation of the Heideggerian version of the problem of 
embodiment either misses the problem entirely or, insofar as living beings are also extant, 
approaches the problem in a roundabout way. 
This chapter's explication of ek-sistence and extantness and its demonstration of 
their necessary and problematic coincidence in the body of the ek-sisting being should be 
sufficient to fend off the first charge. With regard to the second, one must note that 
although the relation between ek-sistence and life in the human body is a genuine 
75 A second ontological problem resulting from Heidegger's sharp distinction between ek-sistence and life 
is how to conceive of the temporality of life. Since ek-sistence is essentially temporality, the non-ek-
sistence of plants and animals entails their non-temporality. But since living beings, unlike extant beings, 
do encounter beings in their environment, their relation to time cannot be the within-time-ness of the 
extant. Heidegger's notion of life as a mode of being distinct from both ek-sistence and extantness thus 
requires the positing of some mysterious third form of time specific to life. Didier Franck, "Being and 
Living" in Who Comes After the Subject?, ed. Eduardo Cadava et. al (New York: Routledge, 1991), 145. 
Heidegger himself raises this murky idea: "It remains a problem ... how and where the Being of animals, 
for instance, is constituted by some kind of 'time'." BT, 396/H346. 
76 Krell, 54. 
77 Cerbone, 225. 
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problem resulting from Dasein's corporeity, it does not constitute the problem of 
embodiment proper. The problem of embodiment is that of how a being is immanent in 
the world it constitutes for itself. Even if Heidegger were able to provide an account of 
the temporality of life and to explain how life and ek-sistence are related in the ek-sisting 
being, the problem would remain of how both living and ek-sisting/living beings are 
immanent in the non-temporal extant upon which they project themselves. While the 
relations between ek-sistence and life and between life and extantness are also problems 
sheltered in Dasein's bodily nature, the problem of the relation between ek-sistence and 
extantness is more fundamental. 
Another problem resulting from Dasein's corporeity is that of the relation between 
spatiality and temporality in Heidegger's thought. The ek-sisting being's engagement 
with beings is ineliminably spatial. The spatiality proper to the ek-sisting being is not 
that of an extant being that occupies a volume of space at a unique set of spatial co-
ordinates. Rather, the ek-sisting being's spatiality, like every other essential 
characteristic of this being, is to be conceived ek-sistentially, or in terms of this being's 
how. Heidegger describes the spatiality of ek-sistence as de-distancing (Ent-fernung) and 
directionality (Ausrichtung). The ek-sisting being encounters beings first and foremost as 
ready-to-hand, and in this encounter, it reduces the "distance" separating it from a being 
when the being becomes the object of concemful attention. Heidegger illustrates the 
difference between extant and ek-sistential spatiality in his example of spotting a friend 
approaching in the distance: at the moment I wave to my friend, he, as the object of my 
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concern, is "closer" to me than is the sidewalk beneath my feet. 78 Further, de-distancing 
always involves directionality: to engage with beings means to find them to the left or the 
right, above or below, and so on.79 My friend approaches me from a definite direction. 
In Division Two of Being and Time, having shown that the meaning of ek-
sistence is temporality, Heidegger must show how all of the Existenzialen uncovered in 
Division One, including spatiality, are grounded in temporality. He argues that ek-
sistential spatiality must be understood in terms of temporality because to de-distance a 
being always means to bring it into the horizon of the present. 80 But it is noteworthy that 
in this section Heidegger explains the temporality of spatiality primarily with reference to 
de-distancing, and not with reference to directionality. While he asserts that making-
present also makes directionality possible, he does not specify how this is so.81 It seems 
likely that a major reason for Heidegger's emphasis on de-distancing over directionality 
in this section is the latter's implication of embodiment. In History of the Concept of 
Time, Heidegger had admitted the link between directionality and embodiment with 
surprising frankness: 
It is because Dasein in its being is oriented in-being that there is right and left. More 
accurately put, because oriented Dasein is corporeal Dasein [italics mine], corporeality 
is necessarily oriented. The orientation of apprehension and looking articulates the 
'straight ahead' and the 'to the right and left.' Dasein is oriented as corporeal, as 
corporeal it is in each instance its right and left, and that is why the parts of the body are 
78 BT, 141-142/H107. While such de-distancing often involves reducing the objective distance between a 
being and one's own body, as when our pilot reaches for the joystick, this need not always be the case, as 
when, for example, one de-distances a friend by making a telephone call. 
79 BT, 143/H108. 
80 BT, 420/H369. 
81 BT, 420/H369. 
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also right and left parts. Accordingly, it belongs to the being of bodily things that they 
are co-constituted by orientation.82 
The directionality of ek-sistential spatiality means that the ek-sisting being is one extant, 
corporeal being amongst others. Since ek-sistential spatiality entails the extantness ofthe 
ek-sisting being, and since extant beings are atemporal, the spatiality of ek-sistence resists 
being reduced to temporality. The irreducibility of spatiality to temporality raises 
important issues in the overall development of Heidegger' s thought. 83 But since the 
present work is confined to the fundamental ontological works of the mid- to late 1920s, 
and since the problem of embodiment, as the problem of the relation between ek-sistence 
and extantness, is at any rate fundamental to the larger question of the relation between 
temporality and spatiality in Heidegger' s thought, this work ignores the latter question. 
A complete study of the problems sheltered in Dasein's bodily nature would 
examine the intersection not only of ek-sistence and extantness, but of ek-sistence and life 
and of life and extantness, as well as the problematic relation between spatiality and 
temporality that arises from these intersections. The present work, as a study of the 
problem of embodiment in fundamental ontology, limits itself to the most basic problem: 
how to conceive of the intersection of ek-sistence and extantness in the human body. 
The task of this chapter has been to articulate the problem of embodiment in terms 
of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. At the beginning of the chapter, ek-sistence was 
82 HCT, 232. This passage shows that it is no accident that the issue of Dasein's "bodily nature" should 
arise in Being and Time just where it does, in the context of the analysis of spatiality. 
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defined as the mode of being constitutive of time and extantness as the mode of being of 
beings that enter into time. By way of an explication of understanding and attunement, 
two basic structures of care, these initial definitions were elaborated and reformulated: 
ek-sistence is essentially ecstatic temporality, and extantness atemporality. Having 
explicated these two modes of being, I turned to the question of whether the human body 
can be adequately accounted for wholly in terms of either mode. Drawing on the 
phenomenological insights of Merleau-Ponty, I showed that the body is not something 
wholly extant and external to ek-sistence, but a constitutive factor of ek-sistence itself. 
Nevertheless, the body is also extant. Extantness thus reveals itself to be essential to ek-
sistence, giving rise to the Heideggerian version of the problem of embodiment: how are 
we to conceive of the intersection of ek-sistence and extantness in the human body? 
Now that this problem has been articulated and distinguished from other problems 
involved in Dasein's bodily nature, we can turn to an examination of how Heidegger 
deals with this problem. Since being extant is a necessary condition of ek-sistence, it 
would seem that fundamental ontology cannot ignore embodiment. The ek-sisting being, 
ostensibly identical with Dasein, can only encounter beings insofar as it shares in their 
extantness, which means that being extant must belong to the essence of Dasein, and that 
embodiment must therefore be included as one of the essential structures of Dasein 
described in fundamental ontology. Once embodiment is admitted as an Existenzia/, the 
problem of embodiment becomes crucial for the existential analytic. To make Dasein 
83 Didier Franck explores these issues in his Heidegger et le Probleme de l 'Espace (Paris: Les editions de 
minuit, 1986), as does Craig Cramm in his "Time, Event, Place: Heidegger on Spatiality" (M.A. thesis, 
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intelligible Heidegger must explain how its body marks the coincidence of the order of 
meaning relations involved in ek-sistence with the order of causal relations involved in 
extantness. But it remains to be seen exactly what Heidegger means by "Dasein," and 
whether the meaning of this crucial term allows Heidegger to skirt the problem of 
embodiment. lfDasein is not identical with the ek-sisting being, Dasein may not need to 
be embodied. And since it is Dasein that is the object of analysis in the existential 
analytic, the problem of embodiment may not be central to fundamental ontology after 
all. In order to secure the importance of the problem of embodiment is central to 
fundamental ontology, the precise meaning of"Dasein" must be determined. 
Memorial University ofNewfoundland, 1999). 
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Chapter Two 
The Concept of Dasein and the Inevitability of the Problem of Embodiment for 
Fundamental Ontology 
2.1 Introduction 
Alphonse de Waelhens points out the central importance of the problem of 
embodiment for fundamental ontology: as long as Heidegger does not explain how ek-
sistence and extantness coincide in Dasein's body, ek-sistence, and the understanding of 
being it elaborates, remains fundamentally opaque. De Waelhens' argument rests on the 
apparently unproblematic assumption that Dasein is indeed embodied. If we take 
"Dasein" to function simply as Heidegger's name for the ek-sisting human being, then the 
necessity ofDasein's embodiment would have been demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
where it was shown that the ek-sisting being must be extant in order to ek-sist. But, as 
this chapter will show, Heidegger's use of the term "Dasein" is not so straightforward. 
Whereas Heidegger often uses "Dasein" to denote individual, ek-sisting human beings, 
his frequent use of such phrases as "the Dasein of man" suggests that Dasein is something 
singular that is distinct from individual human beings and to which human beings 
somehow relate. 84 Such a distinction between human beings and Dasein raises the 
84 Examples of Heidegger's use of "Dasein" to refer to individual human beings are his references to "any 
Dasein" in BPP, 221, "Daseins" in BPP, 289, "one Dasein and another" in BPP, 210, and "every Dasein" 
in BT, 84/H57, 206/H163. In addition to his phrase "the Dasein of man," in KPM, 177, 178, in FCM, 255, 
and in WM, 31, 32, 33, other examples ofHeidegger's use of"Dasein" as something distinct from human 
beings are his references to "our Dasein," in FCM, 100, 114, 115, 117, 162 and in WM, 30, 40, "human 
Dasein," in CT, 6 and in BPP, 221, and to Dasein as "human life" in CT, 6, 12. Heidegger also indicates 
that Dasein is distinct from human beings in his description of Dasein in WM, 14 as the region of being in 
which man stands and in his remark that "Dasein as such is demanded of man .... " FCM, 165. Heidegger's 
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possibility that being extant, though essential to human ek-sistence, is not essential to 
Dasein. Whereas human beings can be seen, touched and heard alongside of other extant 
beings, the Dasein they share eludes the senses. Since it is Dasein that is the object of the 
existential analytic, extantness could therefore be justifiably excluded as an Existenzia/, 
and the problem of embodiment relegated away from fundamental ontology proper and to 
some other ontological discipline that would have fundamental ontology as its basis. 
In this chapter, I argue that although Heidegger indeed distinguishes Dasein from 
human beings, this distinction is not sufficient to undermine the requirement that Dasein 
be extant, and that embodiment therefore requires explication in fundamental ontology 
proper. The development of this argument proceeds in three main stages. In the first 
stage, I distinguish two senses of "Dasein." In the first sense of the term, "Dasein" 
denotes the ecstatically temporal event of the manifestation of beings as beings, or the 
event of ontological difference. In its second sense, "Dasein" denotes the human being, 
one of the beings manifested in this event. After showing that the first sense of "Dasein" 
is primary in fundamental ontology, I proceed with the second stage, which is to point out 
how the distinction between the two senses of "Dasein" and Heidegger' s emphasis on 
Dasein as the event of ontological difference might lead one to conclude that this event 
could occur independently of extant human bodies. Were this the case, being extant 
would be contingent to Dasein-one could, with Hubert Dreyfus, maintain that Dasein is 
ambivalent use of "Dasein" is noted by de Waelhens in La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger (Louvain: 
Editions Nauwelaerts, 1971), 311. 
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essentially disembodied. 85 A consequence of maintaining Dreyfus' position is that the 
problem of embodiment would be most properly addressed not within the existential 
analytic, but within the metaphysics of Dasein, a secondary stage in fundamental 
ontology. 
In the third stage, I argue against Dreyfus' interpretation of Dasein as essentially 
disembodied by showing that spatiality and attunement, two essential structures of the 
event of ontological difference, would not be possible without the presence of the human 
body. The extantness of the human being is thus a necessary condition for the event of 
ontological difference. The first sense of "Dasein" presupposes the second, and the 
problem of embodiment cannot be evaded in fundamental ontology proper. 
2.2 The Two Senses of"Dasein" and the Primacy of the First Sense in 
Fundamental Ontology 
Dasein is the being we in each case are. 86 The being here referred to is not 
something extant, as if each human being were ultimately identical with a world-soul or 
participated in a "sea of Dasein. "87 When Heidegger describes Dasein as the being we in 
each case are, he is not referring to anything extant, but to our way of being, or ek-
sistence. "The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence [Existenz]."88 Heidegger places 
"essence" in scare quotes to indicate his uneasiness with the term in its traditional sense: 
85 Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 41, 137, 
86 BT, 27/H7. 
87 I take this expression from Rebecca Kukla, "The Ontology and Temporality of Conscience" in 
Continental Philosophy Review 35 (2002): 16. 
88 BT, 67/H42. 
40 
although it is true that what we are, or that which makes us what we are, is ek-sistence, 
this ''what" is not a ''what" at all, but a "how." Ek-sistence is a way of being marked by 
self-concern, understanding and attunement and made possible by ecstatic temporality. 
Since this way of being means to be in such a way that one is nothing over and above 
one's engagement with beings, to ek-sist means to be Dasein-to ek-sist means to be 
(Sein) one's "there" (Da), or to be constituted by the web of relations that define one's 
ek-sistential situation. Dasein is made the object of analysis for fundamental ontology 
because its occurrence involves a non-conceptual, pre-ontological understanding of the 
meaning ofbeing. That in terms of which beings are encountered as familiar is ultimately 
always being, and that in terms of which being is familiar is the futural ecstasis of 
temporality. But what is it by virtue of which we are familiar with temporality? 
Heidegger responds to this question by stating that here the sequence of aprioricity comes 
to an end, since we, as Dasein, just are temporality. 89 Dasein, then, is a way of being 
constituted by the occurrence of primordial temporality in which beings become manifest 
in terms ofbeing. 
Dasein can be described more succinctly as the event of ontological difference. 
The ontological difference is the difference between beings (das Seiende), or that which 
is, and being (Sein ), or that in terms of which we understand what it means for beings to 
be. As that which renders beings intelligible, being is different than beings. Yet being is 
89 BPP, 308/H437. 
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also inseparable from beings-since it is not itself something which is, being can never 
be encountered on its own, in isolation from beings.90 Being always belongs to beings, 
not in the sense that beings somehow contain being in any literal, spatial sense, but in the 
sense that beings only have being insofar as they are encountered in Dasein.91 It is only 
with the occurrence of Dasein that beings emerge in the light of being, or that being and 
beings become differentiated. As the occurrence of primordial temporality in which the 
difference between being and beings happens, Dasein is the event of ontological 
difference. 
In addition to denoting the event of ontological difference, "Dasein" also denotes 
human beings. For Heidegger, "this human Dasein is itself a being and thus also falls 
under the question of the being of beings."92 In this second sense of the term, "Dasein" 
sometimes refers to the human individual, and sometimes to a plurality of individuals.93 
Since Dasein, as an individual human being or as a human collective, is a being amongst 
others, Heidegger can speak of Dasein as the ontic condition of possibility of the 
manifestation of beings.94 Human beings are required in order for the event of the 
manifestation of all beings, including human beings themselves, in the light of being. 
90 To say that being is not sounds paradoxical, but is a necessary consequence of the idea of ontological 
difference. As different than beings, being cannot be found in the domain of that which is. Whereas 
beings are, "there is," or better, "it gives" (es gibt) being. Being is given when Dasein occurs. 
91 Whether or not Heidegger's notion of ontological difference commits him to idealism will be discussed 
in Chapter Three. 
92 MFL, 16. 
93 "Dasein" refers to human individuals when Heidegger writes that "even in its fullest concretion Dasein 
can be characterized by inauthenticity-when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for 
enjoyment." BT, 68/H43. "Dasein" refers to humanity in general when Heidegger speaks of a "primitive 
stage ofDasein." BT, 76/H51. 
94 BT, 120/H87, 255/H212. 
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Heidegger uses "Dasein" in this second sense when he states that being-in-the-world, the 
web of relations that is the elaboration of the understanding of being, is a basic state or 
constitution (Verfassung) of Dasein, and that being-in-the-world is "a state of Dasein 
which is necessary a priori, but it is far from sufficient for completely determining 
Dasein's Being."95 When "Dasein" refers to human beings, it refers to beings that are 
constituted not only by ek-sistence, but by life and extantness. 
By keeping the twofold sense of "Dasein" in mind, light can be shed on some 
apparently contradictory statements made by Heidegger with regard to Dasein. On the 
one hand, Heidegger writes that "Dasein cannot be proven as an entity, it cannot even be 
pointed out. The primary relation to Dasein is not that of contemplation, but 'being it. "'96 
Dasein is not something we come across alongside of other beings; it is not something 
that can be looked at. Rather, Dasein is only known insofar as it is our way of being. 
Thus the fact that Dasein is not present-at-hand within space and time "needs no further 
discussion."97 On the other hand, Heidegger writes that Dasein involves "simultaneously 
being present at hand for Others, namely, just as a stone is there which neither has nor is 
concerned with a world there" and that "like any other entity, Dasein too is present-at-
hand .. .. "98 Such apparently contradictory statements can be reconciled by interpreting 
the former statements as referring to Dasein as the event of ontological difference, and the 
95 BT, 861H59, 79/H54. 
%HCT,9. 
97 BT, 418/H367. 
98 CT, 7-8; BT, 245/H201. 
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latter as referring to Dasein as one of the beings made manifest in this event, that is, to 
extant, living human individuals.99 
Although Heidegger, especially in Being and Time, often uses "Dasein" to refer to 
human beings, the primary sense of the term throughout the fundamental ontological 
writings is the event of ontological difference.100 Heidegger emphasizes the latter sense at 
the outset of the existential analytic: 
The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which 
can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 
'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it 
99 Keeping the twofold sense of "Dasein" in mind also sheds light on the debate as to whether Dasein is to 
be identified with the human individual. Dasein can be identified with the human individual or with 
humanity in general, provided one remembers that this sense of Dasein is secondary to the sense of Dasein 
as the event of ontological difference. Theodor Schatzki and Mariana Ortega are right to claim that 
"Dasein" refers to individual human beings. Schatzki, "Early Heidegger on Being, The Clearing, and 
Realism" in Heidegger: A Critical Reader, ed. Dreyfus, Hall (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 82; 
Ortega, "Dasein Comes after the Epistemic Subject, But Who is Dasein?" in International Philosophical 
Quarterly 40, no. 1 (2000): 59. But it would be a mistake to argue that Dasein is only the human being, or, 
following Schatzki, to argue from the fact that "Dasein" refers to the human being that there is a plurality 
of "clearings" or events in which beings are manifested in terms of being. Schatzki, 96. To infer a 
plurality of events of ontological difference from the plurality of human beings is to make the mistake of 
taking Dasein's extantness to be more fundamental than its ek-sistence. Schatzki assumes that the event of 
ontological difference is conditioned or pluralized by the plurality of extant human beings, when 
Heidegger wants to maintain that even the plurality of extant human beings is made possible by the 
singular event of ontological difference. MFL, 138. 
100 Whereas Heidegger in BT calls Dasein "man himself," in BPP Dasein is identified with "man's Being." 
BT, 32/Hll; BPP, 16. The shift in emphasis to Dasein as the event of ontological difference is also well-
illustrated by a marginal note to BTmade by Heidegger after its publication in 1927. In section 10 of that 
work, in which Heidegger distinguishes the existential analytic from anthropology, psychology and 
biology, he writes that "we must show that those investigations and formulations of the question which 
have been aimed at Dasein heretofore, have missed the real philosophical problem .... " BT, 71/H45. The 
natural and social sciences investigate Dasein insofar as "Dasein" refers directly to human beings, but they 
ignore Dasein' s status as the understanding of being, or as the event of ontological difference. Heidegger 
would later note in the margin that the natural and social sciences "did not aim at Da-sein at all." BT, trans. 
Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 43. Heidegger's remark here stems from his later 
conception of Dasein as primarily the event of ontological difference: the natural and social scientific 
approaches to the human being miss Dasein altogether because they interpret the human being as 
something extant and ignore Dasein, the event of ontological difference in which human beings are 
manifested. 
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to be, and no more than that.. .. So when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein', 
we are expressing not its "what" (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being. 101 
Although "Dasein" does refer to the human being, it does not refer to it as something that 
is extant along with tables, houses or trees. Instead, "Dasein" refers to ek-sistence, the 
distinctive way of being of human being. The possible ways ofbeing of this being, such 
as practical engagement with beings and theoretical contemplation of them, are 
characteristics of ek-sistence. Ek-sistence in turn is the "explicit accomplishment and the 
development of the ontological difference"-ek-sistence is essentially the temporally 
ecstatic event of ontological difference. 102 The existential analytic aims to articulate the 
essential structures of this event, or the essential aspects of the manifestation of beings in 
terms ofbeing. 
Heidegger makes the primacy of the latter sense of "Dasein" more explicit in The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. In section 10 of that work, Heidegger states that the 
first principle of the existential analytic is that "Dasein," and not "man" is the term used 
to denote its object.103 To call this being "man" would be to risk confusing an inquiry 
into the essential structures of the event of ontological difference with an anthropology of 
the being partially constituted by this event.104 In addition to the concept of ek-sistence 
introduced in Being and Time, Heidegger here introduces another characteristic of 
Dasein: neutrality. Whereas "factical Dasein," or Dasein as one being amongst others, 
101 BT, 67/H42. 
102 BPP, 319/H455. 
103 MFL, 136. 
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has a gender," neutral Dasein "is neither of the two sexes."105 The event of ontological 
difference does not have a gender; Dasein is gendered only insofar as it is an extant, 
living being. By introducing the concept of Dasein's neutrality, Heidegger makes it 
explicit that in fundamental ontology, "Dasein" refers primarily to the event of 
ontological difference. 
2.3 The Question of Whether Dasein is Essentially Disembodied 
Once the two senses of "Dasein" are distinguished and their order of priority in 
fundamental ontology established, Heidegger's exclusion of embodiment as an 
Existenzial becomes more comprehensible. As Heidegger makes clear in section 10 of 
The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, his aim in the existential analytic is to articulate 
the essential structures of Dasein insofar as it is the event of ontological difference. Since 
Dasein's status as a bodily being, or as a being that is alive and extant, is not the focus of 
the investigation, embodiment can be justifiably excluded as an Existenzial. But the fact 
that embodied Dasein is not the object of the existential analytic need not mean that 
fundamental ontology would ignore Dasein's embodiment altogether. The existential 
analytic is a preparatory stage in fundamental ontology, and in two senses. It is 
preparatory in the sense that it prepares the way for the articulation of the meaning of 
being as temporality, after which the structures of Dasein uncovered in Division One of 
Being and Time can be re-interpreted in terms of temporality in Chapter Four ofDivision 
104 Heidegger emphasizes the distinction between the existential analytic and anthropology repeatedly in 
Being and Time. Cf. BT, 74-75/H47-49, 170/H131, 227/H183, 238/H194. 
105 MFL, 136. 
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Two. 106 But the analytic is also preparatory "with regard to an ontology, a metaphysics of 
Dasein," an undertaking which in the preparatory existential analytic "is not yet the 
central focus."107 The existential analytic does not aspire to a complete ontology of 
Dasein; it analyzes Dasein only insofar as it is constituted by the understanding of being, 
or insofar as Dasein marks the event of ontological difference.108 In the event of 
ontological difference, Dasein appears not only as a being constituted by this event, but 
also as a being that is alive and extant. A complete ontology of Dasein would examine 
Dasein not only with regard to its understanding of being, but also with regard to these 
other ontological characteristics. 
Such an ontology can be deemed a "metaphysics" since for Heidegger, 
metaphysics aims to grasp the defining characteristics of beings without regard to the 
event of disclosure that makes such an inquiry possible.109 It would be the task of a 
complete ontology or metaphysics of Dasein to provide a comprehensive account of the 
ontological characteristics that make Dasein the being that it is and that distinguish it 
from other beings.110 Since a central and distinctive aspect ofDasein is the intersection of 
ek-sistence and extantness in its body, a chief task of the complete ontology of Dasein 
would be to provide an account of how this intersection is to be understood. In the 
overall project of fundamental ontology, the proper place for addressing the problem of 
embodiment would be not in the preparatory existential analytic, but in the metaphysics 
106 BT, 38/H17. 
107 MFL, 101, 136. 
108 BT, 38/H17. 
109 WM, 8-9. 
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of Dasein. 111 Thus while Alphonse de Waelhens would be correct to point out that 
Heidegger's neglect of the problem of embodiment renders the existential analytic 
incomplete, he would be mistaken in his judgment that this incompleteness renders the 
analytic essentially flawed. The absence of the body in Being and Time would appear to 
be problematic only if one mistakenly takes the analytic to have embodied Dasein as its 
object. 
But while such a sharp distinction between Dasein as the event of ontological 
difference and as an embodied being may seem to justify Heidegger' s exclusion of 
embodiment as an Existenzial, it also raises the question of whether Dasein can take place 
independently of the presence of human bodies. Now, Heidegger makes it clear that 
Dasein in fact never occurs independently of human bodies: "neutral Dasein is never what 
exists; Dasein exists in each case only in its factical concretion."112 It is a matter of fact 
that the manifestation of beings in terms of being always takes place in conjunction with 
extant, living human bodies. This fact dictates the manner of approach of the existential 
analytic. The essential structures of Dasein to be unearthed in the analytic are "not just 
any accidental structures, but essential ones which, in every kind of Being that factical 
110 BT, 169/H131. 
111 Since it is factical Dasein, or humanity, that is embodied, one might also be inclined to identify 
philosophical anthropology as the proper place for addressing the problem of embodiment. For Heidegger, 
anthropology would be philosophical were it to study humanity in the light of insights drawn from the 
complete ontology of Dasein. BT, 38/Hl7. Such a discipline would examine, amongst other things, the 
basic features and interconnections of the possibilities of concrete human life. BT, 348/H301. One such 
question it would consider would be how necessary interpersonal relationships are for human beings. BPP, 
278/H394. But since embodiment is not one ek-sistential possibility amongst others, but a condition of the 
possibility of ek-sistence, a treatment of the problem of embodiment would belong in the metaphysics of 
Dasein, the stage of fundamental ontology in which the conditions of the possibility of human ek-sistence 
are comprehensively described. 
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Dasein [italics mine] may possess, persist as determinative for the character of its 
Being."113 Since the event of Dasein is always conjoined with Dasein as the concrete 
human being, the existential analytic must begin with the manifold phenomena of human 
ek-sistence in order to discern their essential structures. When Heidegger states in The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic that the existential analytic has neutral, as opposed to 
factical, Dasein as its object, he does not mean that the analytic begins by disregarding 
Dasein in its concrete, factical dimension in order to focus attention on the event of 
ontological difference. The analytic does not begin with a clear view of neutral or 
essential Dasein; but aims to arrive at such a view through phenomenological description 
of factical Dasein. As William McNeill writes, "in Being and Time Dasein does indeed 
come into view to some extent as a being, but only insofar as is phenomenologically 
necessary to gain access to its being .... "114 Since factical and neutral Dasein are always 
found together, fundamental ontology must begin with the former in order to discern the 
latter. 
While it is clear that Dasein as the event of ontological difference always occurs 
in conjunction with the presence of human bodies, it is less clear why this is so. Is the 
presence of human bodies necessary for the occurrence of this event, or is it merely 
accidental that human bodies are present wherever Dasein occurs? Heidegger' s exclusion 
of embodiment as an Existenzial suggests that the latter is the case, or that Dasein is 
112 MFL, 137. 
113 BT, 38/H17. 
114 William McNeill, "Metaphysics, Fundamental Ontology, Metontology 1925-1935," Heidegger Studies 8 
(1992): 75. 
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essentially disembodied. Dasein's apparent disembodiment does not go unnoticed by 
Hubert Dreyfus, who notes that "Heidegger seems to suggest that having a body does not 
belong to Dasein's essential structure" and that Heidegger "holds that the body is not 
essential."115 Dreyfus goes on to assert that the idea of a disembodied Dasein is a logical 
consequence of Heidegger' s concept of Dasein, writing that "it no doubt follows from the 
generality ofDasein's way of being as essentially self-interpreting activity that Dasein is 
not necessarily embodied."116 As self-interpreting activity, or as the process of 
understanding in which Dasein is disclosed to itself as, for example, an immortal soul or a 
living organism, Dasein does not require embodiment. Heidegger' s use of scare quotes in 
his deferral of the problem ofDasein's "bodily nature" in Being and Time would thus be 
invested with a special significance: Dasein's "bodily nature" would only arise in the 
existential analytic on the basis of a failure to appreciate that the Dasein here under 
consideration need not be tied to a body at all. Such an interpretation of Dasein raises the 
possibility that Heidegger, despite his opposition to the Cartesian conception of the 
human being as a combination of an extant body with an extant soul, maintains a variety 
of dualism no less radical than that of Descartes. 
2.4 The Necessity of Human Bodies for the Occurrence of Ontological Difference 
In order to assess the possibility of a disembodied Dasein, the nature of the 
relation between the two senses of "Dasein" must be determined. Dasein could be 
disembodied if the first sense of "Dasein," in which Dasein is the event of ontological 
115 Dreyfus, 41, 137. 
116 Dreyfus, 41. 
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difference, does not necessarily imply the second, in which Dasein is the living, extant 
human being. It would be possible for Dasein to be disembodied if human bodies are not 
required for the event of ontological difference to occur. In this section I will argue that 
the notion of a disembodied Dasein is not coherent. As Existenzialen, attunement and 
spatiality are essential to the event of ontological difference, and neither spatiality nor 
attunement are possible without extant human bodies. Thus the conjunction of human 
bodies with the event of ontological difference is not contingent: the extant human body, 
with its powers of sensibility and motility, is a necessary condition for the event of 
Dasein to occur. 
Dasein's attunement presupposes the presence of the body in three ways. First, 
embodiment is presupposed in attunement's disclosure of how Dasein is. At first glance, 
this seems obvious. Only corporeally individuated human beings find themselves in 
moods such as fear, boredom, cheerfulness, and so on-it is difficult to conceive of a 
mood belonging to the event of ontological difference abstracted from the presence of 
human bodies. Yet, as Michel Haar points out, for Heidegger, mood or Stimmung does 
not refer in the first instance to the interior emotional state of an individual human 
being.117 Heidegger writes that "having a mood is not related to the psychical in the first 
instance, and is not itself an inner condition which then reaches forth in an enigmatical 
way and puts its mark on Things and persons."118 Rather, "only because the "there" has 
already been disclosed in a state-of-mind [attunement] can immanent reflection come 
117 Haar, "Le primat de la Stimmung sur la corporeite du Dasein," Heidegger Studies 2 (1986): 70. 
118 BT, 176/H137. 
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across 'Experiences' at al1."119 Stimmung denotes first and foremost the ambiance or 
affective tone that characterizes the "there," or an overall situation in which beings 
present themselves, and not an interior emotional state. The interiorization of a mood, the 
experience of the mood as belonging to me, is a secondary moment that follows upon the 
initial, primordial, impersonal attunement of the event. 120 It would thus seem that the 
event of ontological difference is itself attuned independently of its conjunction with the 
presence of human bodies. 
Yet even in the initial, impersonal moment of mood, before the mood is 
experienced as a state of one's own organism, the presence of the body is presupposed. 
Accompanying the manifestation of beings in terms of mood are physiological 
modifications of the human body. Now one could, following Haar, deny that 
physiological factors determine attunement. 121 On Haar's reading of Heidegger, it is 
rather the case that the human body and its physiological processes are "inserted" (insere} 
into the ontological structures ofDasein, and that these structures are sufficient to account 
for the phenomenon of attunement. 122 Haar' s metaphor of insertion expresses the idea 
that the causal processes of nature play no constitutive role in ek-sistential phenomena. 
Stripped of any explanatory role, the body merely accompanies experience, which is 
entirely explicable in terms of ontological structures such as understanding, attunement 
and spatiality. But such a position is inconsistent with Heidegger's own statement that 
119 BT, 175/H136 
120 Haar, 72. 
121 Haar, 71. 
122 Haar, 69 
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physiological processes condition mood. In his discussion of anxiety (Angst), he writes 
that "anxiety is often conditioned by 'physiological' factors," adding that "only because 
Dasein is anxious in the very depths of its Being, does it become possible for anxiety to 
be elicited physiologically."123 For Heidegger, physiology alone is not sufficient to 
account for attunement. Only a being constituted by the event of ontological difference 
relates to beings in an attuned manner-the physiological constitution of a dog, for 
example, is never sufficient to allow it to undergo anxiety. Nevertheless, the fact that 
anxiety can be physiologically conditioned indicates that the human body, while not a 
sufficient condition for attunement, is a necessary one. By acknowledging that some 
moods would not be possible without physiological phenomena, Heidegger effectively 
acknowledges that the presence of the human body is necessary for any mood 
whatsoever. It would be implausible and highly problematic for Heidegger to assert that 
while some moods are physiologically conditioned, others are not, since the question 
would then arise as to how it is that at certain phases of the physiological process, states 
of the organism temporarily cease to give rise to moods. It is much more plausible that 
all moods, and not merely some instances of anxiety, are conditioned by physiological 
factors, and consequently that the human body is necessary for attunement's disclosure of 
how Dasein is. 
The presence of the human body is also presupposed in attunement's disclosure 
that Dasein is. In the event of ontological difference, the range of possibilities in terms of 
123 BT, 234/H190. 
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which beings manifest themselves is determined by pre-giVen social and cultural 
circumstances. Dasein has always already been, and to be in a mood is to experience the 
burden of finding oneself in the midst of a life that is ultimately not of one's own 
choosing. One cannot choose to be born, and, having been born, one cannot undo the 
circumstances of one's birth. Birth, or the emergence of the human body into the realm 
of the extant, thus reveals itself as the natural event without which the event of 
ontological difference would not be possible. Finding oneself thrown into a set of 
cultural, social and historical circumstances is rooted in the fact that one ek-sists through 
a body generated at a definite point in time. 
Now one could draw on Haar's notion of the body's "insertion" into Dasein to 
interpret birth not as a necessary condition for throwness, but as one instance of 
throwness alongside of others. 124 Dasein would not find itself thrown because it was 
born, but would find itself born only because it is thrown. But the denial of any 
determinate role to the natural event of birth runs into the problem of why it is that only 
human bodies are inserted into Dasein. What is it about animal bodies that precludes 
their birth from being conditioned by throwness? If the physiological constitution of the 
human body is denied any determinate role in attunement, there can be no explanation for 
the fact that only human birth is an instance of throwness. If one is not to maintain that 
Dasein could just as easily determine non-human bodies, one must grant that the 
constitution of the extant human body accounts for its status as the sole kind of living 
124 Haar, 69. 
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body that is conjoined with the event of ontological difference. Once again the human 
body reveals itself to function as a constitutive factor in the occurrence of the event of 
ontological difference. 
In addition to disclosing how and that Dasein is, attunement also discloses the 
ways in which beings can matter, and this aspect of attunement presupposes the body as 
well. As attuned, the event of ontological difference manifests beings as threatening, 
auspicious, gloomy, and so on. Dasein involves being affected by beings, and such 
affects can only arise insofar as "Dasein" denotes sensing beings able to suffer the 
presence of the beings that surround them. While acknowledging that the senses are 
involved in attunement, Heidegger emphasizes that they are not sufficient to account for 
it: 
And only because the 'senses' [die "Sinne"] belong ontologically to an entity whose kind 
of Being is Being-in-the-world with a state-of mind, can they be 'touched' by anything 
or 'have a sense for' ["Sinn haben fur"] something in such a way that what touches them 
shows itself in an affect. Under the strongest pressure and resistance, nothing like an 
affect would come about, and the resistance itself would remain essentially 
undiscovered, if Being-in-the-world, with its state-of-mind, had not already submitted 
itself [sich schon angewiesen] to having entities within-the-world "matter" to it in a way 
which its moods have outlined in advance. 125 
While the extant body, through its senses, is constituted so as to be responsive to the 
beings that surround it, this constitution is never sufficient to allow beings to matter. 
Only a being constituted by the event of ontological difference, or by being-in-the-world, 
senses other beings in an attuned way. But although the senses are not sufficient to give 
rise to attunement, they are nonetheless necessary for it. Beings could never appear, let 
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alone matter, were it not for the senses of the extant body through which they become 
manifest. 
Heidegger's inclusion of spatiality as an Existenzial also precludes the possibility 
of disembodied Dasein. As noted in Chapter One, Heidegger himself suggests that the 
spatiality pertaining to the event of ontological difference implicates the presence of 
human bodies, stating in History of the Concept of Time that "oriented Dasein is 
corporeal Dasein."126 However, he does not state that there is a necessary connection 
between the spatiality and corporeality of Dasein. Such a connection reveals itself when 
we consider de-distancing and directionality, the two major features of Dasein's 
spatiality. The de-distancing of beings requires the body's powers of motility: the 
workman in his workshop brings the beings around him to bear on his project by walking 
over to them, by raising his arm to reach for them, and so on. As Didier Franck writes, 
''Now it is essential. .. that Dasein have hands so that, all metaphors aside, the being of 
the being that it is could be named being-at-hand."127 Since de-distancing involves, 
amongst other bodily actions, reaching for and grasping beings with one's hands, the term 
"readiness-to-hand" should be taken literally: beings present themselves as ready for use 
to an embodied Dasein endowed with hands. The second major feature of Dasein's 
spatiality, directionality, also presupposes the presence of the body, since having a 
perspective on beings-finding them, for example, in the "fixed directions of right and 
125 BT, 176-177/H137. 
126 HCT, 232/H319. 
127 Franck, "Being and the Living," 144. 
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left" 128-requires that one find oneself corporeally situated in their midst. The division 
of space into right and left, front and back, up and down is rooted in the fact that the 
extant body functions as the zero-point of spatial experience. 
A consideration of the phenomena of spatiality and attunement has shown that the 
human body is a constitutive factor of the event of ontological difference, or that the 
conjunction of this event with the presence of bodies is not contingent. When Dreyfus 
claims that "it no doubt follows from the generality of Dasein's way of being as 
essentially self-interpreting activity that Dasein is not necessarily embodied,"129 he fails to 
consider this self-interpreting activity with sufficient care. The self-interpreting activity, 
or being-in-the-world, that is constitutive ofDasein is essentially spatial and attuned, and 
as such, it is necessarily embodied. It should be noted, however, that Dasein's essential 
embodiment is rather peculiar. Whereas the event of ontological difference is singular 
and unique, there is a plurality of human bodies. This means that there is no one to one 
correspondence between Dasein as the embodied human being and Dasein as the event of 
ontological difference. Instead, the singular event of ontological difference somehow 
occurs through a plurality of extant human bodies. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to secure the central importance of the 
problem of embodiment for the existential analytic. After showing in Chapter One that 
being extant is essential to the ek-sisting human being, this chapter began by raising the 
possibility that since Heidegger distinguishes between Dasein and the ek-sisting being, 
128 BT, 143/HIOS. 
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being extant, though necessary for ek-sistence, may not be necessary for Dasein. Were 
this the case, Heidegger would be justified in excluding embodiment as an essential 
structure of Dasein, and a discussion of embodiment could be relegated to the 
metaphysics of Dasein, a secondary discipline in fundamental ontology. Though Dasein 
as the event of ontological difference always occurs in conjunction with Dasein as the 
embodied human being, there would be no necessary connection between the two, and 
Dasein would be essentially disembodied. By showing that spatiality and attunement, 
two essential structures of the event of ontological difference, both require the presence 
of the human body, a necessary connection between Dasein and the human body has been 
established. Insofar as the body is partially constitutive of the occurrence of ontological 
difference, the extantness of the body is a necessary but insufficient condition for the 
latter. Now that extant human beings have been identified with factical Dasein and ek-
sistence with neutral Dasein, the Heideggerian version of the problem of embodiment can 
be reformulated: how can we render intelligible the occurrence of the event of ontological 
difference through one of the beings it makes manifest? The next chapter will examine 
the possibilities fundamental ontology has at its disposal to deal with this problem and 
will reveal the central difficulty it encounters-the risk of falling into transcendental 
realism. 
129 Dreyfus, 41. 
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Chapter Three 
Dasein's Embodiment and Transcendental Realism 
3.1 Introduction 
The human body presents fundamental ontology with a crucial problem it cannot 
evade: how does the human body function as the medium for the manifestation of all 
beings, including itself, in the light of being? In this chapter, I will examine some 
possible solutions to this problem and reveal a major difficulty that helps to account for 
its neglect in Heidegger's project: Dasein's embodiment threatens to lead fundamental 
ontology into transcendental realism. Any account ofDasein's embodiment that remains 
faithful both to the phenomenon of embodiment and to Heidegger' s ontological 
categories runs the risk of grounding temporality, that which makes possible the 
intelligibility of the being ofbeings, in the domain ofwhat is. A transcendental condition 
of possibility would be situated within the domain of that which it conditions, thereby 
losing its transcendental status, and being would be situated at the level of beings, thereby 
violating ontological difference. 
The development of this claim proceeds in three main stages. In the first stage, I 
explain why fundamental ontology cannot admit a naturalistic solution to the problem of 
embodiment. To explain all meaning relations in terms of causal relations, or to reduce 
ek-sistence to extantness, would entail locating the meaning of being entirely within the 
realm of beings. Heidegger calls such a move "telling a story" about being, and rejects it 
as an adequate approach to the question of the meaning of being on account of the 
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transcendental nature of his project. 130 In the second stage, I explain why fundamental 
ontology cannot admit a purely transcendental solution to the problem of embodiment 
either. As the phenomenon of the lived body reveals, and as Heidegger himself suggests, 
the body is not merely the outcome of the operation of transcendental structures.131 
Instead, the body is itself transcendentally constitutive. Fundamental ontology thus 
requires an approach to the problem of embodiment that would chart a middle course 
between the extremes of naturalism and transcendentalism, at the same time as avoiding 
the error of transcendental realism. In the third stage, I explore the potential of 
Heidegger's proposed project of a "metontology" to provide such an approach and argue 
that metontology fails as a way of addressing Dasein's embodiment because it falls into 
transcendental realism. Having shown that Heidegger' s neglect of embodiment can be 
accounted for by the threat of transcendental realism, the chapter concludes by evaluating 
some explanations for this neglect that have been offered by other commentators. 
3.2 The Impermissibility of a Purely Naturalistic Solution to the Problem of 
Embodiment in Fundamental Ontology 
One strategy for tackling the problem of embodiment is to take a naturalistic 
approach, in which the coincidence of the order of causes and the order of meaning in the 
human body is made intelligible by reducing the latter to the former. Conceived 
naturalistically, the experience of the world as meaningful is a function of nature, the 
multiplicity of causally related events. Thus the intersection of nature and meaning in the 
130 BT, 26/H6. 
131 MFL, 138. 
60 
human body is only apparent, since all phenomena are ultimately mere manifestations of 
a more fundamental natural substratum. From a naturalistic perspective, the 
differentiation of being from beings constitutive of human understanding is completely 
explicable in terms of causal relations that obtain in the domain of beings. Seen in this 
light, Heidegger' s analyses of understanding and attunement would be descriptions of 
subjective states that result from neurological events, and his analysis of spatiality a 
description of the subjective experience of extant bodies in motion. In a naturalistic 
approach to the problem of embodiment, all ek-sistential phenomena would be reducible 
to the natural realm of the extant, and the extantness of the human body would be not 
only necessary for ontological difference, but sufficient as well. 
Fundamental ontology rules out a naturalistic approach to the embodiment 
problem in principle. The aim of fundamental ontology is to articulate the meaning of 
being, or the condition of the possibility of our pre-ontological understanding of what it 
means for beings to be. For Heidegger, nature, whether it is understood as a ready-to-
hand resource or as "the aggregate of the present-at-hand," is one of the beings whose 
being fundamental ontology investigates. 132 Thus to maintain that the intelligibility of 
being is made possible entirely by nature is to locate this condition of possibility within 
132 BT, 100/H70, 413/H362. For Heidegger, nature, like all beings, is initially encountered as ready-to-
hand: "The wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the river is water-power, the wind is 
wind 'in the sails'." BT, 100/H70. Only when its readiness-to-hand is disregarded is nature understood as 
present-at-hand, as it is, for example, in Merleau-Ponty's defmition of nature as a multiplicity of causally 
related events. Heidegger also mentions an aesthetic understanding of nature, writing that when nature is 
understood as present-at-hand, "the Nature which 'stirs and strives', which assails us and enthrals us as 
landscape, remains hidden." BT, 100/H70. He does not, however, include the aesthetic understanding of 
nature (or of beings in general) as a mode of understanding distinct from presence-at-hand and readiness-
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the domain of beings. The meaning of being would be constituted by one of the beings 
that make up the domain of what is. Heidegger, borrowing an expression from Plato's 
Sophist, calls the attempt to elucidate being through an account of its origin in beings 
telling a story about being, and he argues that such an approach is doomed to failure. 133 
All ontological story-telling remains open to the fundamental ontological question: what 
does it mean for the origin of being to be? What exactly do we understand when we 
understand that nature is? Within the framework of fundamental ontology, a purely 
naturalistic solution to the embodiment problem is impermissible, since the meaning of 
being must be a transcendental condition of the possibility of its intelligibility.134 
To attempt to account for being in terms of beings would mean conducting 
fundamental ontology in what Heidegger calls an inauthentic mode of understanding. 
Dasein occurs in two basic modes: authentically (eigentlich) or inauthentically 
(uneigentlich). It occurs inauthentically when human beings, absorbed in their everyday 
lives, remain unmoved by the groundlessness of their own ek-sistence, or by the 
to-hand. This omission is criticized by Michel Haar in The Song of the Earth, trans. Reginald Lilly 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 17. 
133 BT, 26/H6. 
134 Another story about being is that beings were established and are maintained in their being through the 
creative act of God, who endowed the human mind with its implicit understanding of the being of creation. 
Like the naturalistic story, this story of the intelligibility of being is open to the fundamental ontological 
question of what it means for God to be. By arguing that any relation to a supreme being presupposes the 
more fundamental question of the meaning of being, Heidegger undermines the sense of meaning provided 
by the idea of God. As constituted by Dasein, human beings are "metaphysically isolated." MFL, 13 7. 
Since Dasein is the event of the manifestation of beings as beings, any being to which human beings relate, 
including God, is grounded in Dasein itself and therefore cannot provide the human being with an ultimate 
ground. We are isolated in the sense that we cannot with ontological clarity seek guidance for our ek-
sistence from any divine power. Since Heidegger understands metaphysics to have for its object beings as 
such and in their totality without regard for the Dasein that makes such an inquiry possible, the human 
being's isolation in the midst of the totality of beings is called a metaphysical isolation. WM, 8-9. 
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astonishing and terrifying fact that there are beings at all, and not rather nothing. 135 In 
the inauthentic mode of understanding, the possibilities upon which beings are projected 
are ways of ek-sisting that, as much as they may alter ontic states of affairs, leave 
unquestioned what it means for beings to be.. In inauthentic attunement, it is merely 
beings that matter as, for example, fearful or inspiring. The authentic occurrence of 
Dasein is first made possible when, assailed by profound anxiety or boredom, we no 
longer find our everyday concerns fulfilling or relevant. 136 These authentic modes of 
attunement wrench us from our absorption in beings, making us aware of the uncanny 
fact of ek-sistence, which at bottom is the differentiation of beings from being that occurs 
in temporality. Authentic Dasein occurs when we affirm the ultimate groundlessness of 
ek-sistence and ek-sist in terms of possibilities we have explicitly chosen for ourselves, 
thereby making ek-sistence our own (eigen). 137 In authentic understanding, human beings 
project possibilities upon beings in an awareness of the mystery of being. Authenticity, 
by maintaining the mystery of being as the primary concern, makes it possible to raise the 
135 Whereas authentic Dasein is characterized by thaumazein-"observing entities and marvelling at 
them .... to be amazed to the point of not understanding"-inauthentic Dasein remains at the level of mere 
curiosity, or the desire for change and novelty in the encounter with beings. BT, 216/H172. 
136 For Heidegger's analysis of anxiety (Angst), cf. BT, 228-234/H184-190. For his analysis of boredom, 
cf. FCM, 132-160. 
137 BT, 68/H42-43. Richard Cohen notes that while some commentators interpret Heidegger's concept of 
authentic Dasein as radical wilfulness, others see it as a quasi-religious submission. Cohen, "Dasein's 
Responsibility for Being," Philosophy Today 27 (1983): 317. Keeping in mind the twofold sense of 
"Dasein," one can see how authenticity is both simultaneously. Human beings wilfully take up ek-sistence 
and create their own meaning by virtue of submitting themselves to the meaningless event of ontological 
difference. To own ek-sistence is also to be "owned" by this event. 
A detailed account of Heidegger's concept of authenticity would include accounts of his analyses of 
death, conscience, guilt and social life (being-with, or Mitsein), a task that exceeds the scope of the present 
study. 
63 
question of the meaning of being. 138 In the grip of authentic Dasein and intent on the 
meaning of being, fundamental ontology does not permit the ontological story-telling 
implicated by a naturalistic solution to the problem of embodiment. 
3.3 The Inappropriateness of a Purely Transcendental Solution to the Problem of 
Embodiment in Fundamental Ontology 
Given the transcendental nature of fundamental ontology, it would seem that 
Heidegger is committed to a purely transcendental solution to the problem of 
embodiment. From a transcendental perspective, the coincidence of the order of causes 
and the order of meaning in the human body is made intelligible by interpreting the 
former as a function of the latter. That is, all experience, including the experience of 
ourselves as immanent in the natural order, results from the imposition of transcendental 
structures on something that is unknowable in itself. Since this something can only be 
given content insofar as it is transcendentally conditioned, what it is apart from the 
operation of the transcendental machinery cannot be determined. The existence of this 
something can only be posited-we can only say that it is. Whether or not we are 
somehow immanent in this something can only be a matter of speculation. Both the idea 
of the real as an order of causally related events and our experience of immanence in this 
order result from transcendental structures. Like the naturalistic approach, the 
138 For Heidegger, the question of the meaning ofbeing is not a matter of mere curiosity or idle speculation, 
but vitally important to human culture and history: " ... the question of being, the striving for an 
understanding of being, is the basic determinant of existence.... Because it belongs to the essential 
constitution of man to understand being, the question of being, taken in the way mentioned, is a question, 
even the question, about man himself." MFL, 16. 
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transcendental approach to embodiment makes intelligible the intersection of nature and 
meaning in the body by accounting for one order in terms of the other. 
Already with Heidegger' s concept of nature, we see in fundamental ontology a 
tendency towards a purely transcendental solution to the embodiment problem. Nature, 
far from constituting a ground for the intelligibility of being, is rather to be conceived as 
one of the beings whose intelligibility is made possible by the transcendental occurrence 
of temporality. Heidegger's tendency towards a transcendental approach to embodiment 
is further confirmed by the limited conception of the body hinted at in Being and Time. 
To put the point in Merleau-Ponty's terms, Heidegger in that work seems to conceive of 
the body solely as objective, and not as lived.139 Thus while Heidegger rejects a 
conception of being-in-the-world as a compound of two extant beings, one spiritual and 
the other corporeal, he does not explore how the lived body enters into the constitution of 
being-in-the-world.140 Heidegger suggests that the body, like nature, is one of the beings 
made intelligible by the event of ontological difference, and does not itself enter into the 
constitution of this event. 
Fundamental ontology's tendency towards a purely transcendental approach to the 
problem of embodiment is perhaps best revealed by Heidegger's discussion of idealism in 
Being in Time. Since the being of beings is a function of the event of ontological 
difference, and since this event is constitutive of human understanding, it would appear 
that Heidegger is committed to idealism. Since the being of beings is dependent on 
139 Franck, Heidegger et le probleme de l'espace, 58. 
140 BT, 82/H56. 
65 
Dasein, the absence of Dasein would seem to entail the absence of all beings. Can 
fundamental ontology avoid such a radical consequence? Heidegger responds: 
Of course only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an understanding of Being is 
ontically possible), 'is there' Being. When Dasein does not exist, 'independence' 'is' 
not either, nor 'is' the 'in-itself. In such a case this sort of thing can be neither 
understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities with-the-world can neither 
be discovered nor lie hidden. In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it 
be said that they are not. But now, as long as there is an understanding of Being and 
therefore an understanding of presence-at-hand, it can indeed be said that in this case 
entities will still continue to be. As we have noted, Being (not entities) is dependent 
upon the understanding ofBeing .... 141 
As he does elsewhere, Heidegger maintains that there are beings independently of Dasein, 
but qualifies this statement with the observation that the statement itself is only 
intelligible in terms of Dasein's understanding. 142 Any characterization of beings, 
including statements concerning their reality or ideality, is only possible in terms of 
Dasein's understanding of being. However, beings themselves, the bare x upon which the 
understanding of being operates, are not dependent upon Dasein. Whether or not 
Dasein's body somehow inheres in this x cannot be determined, since to affirm or deny 
such inherence would be to qualify that which can only be posited. In the light of a 
purely transcendental approach to embodiment, the necessity of the extant body for 
ontological difference does not mean that the body precedes the occurrence of 
temporality in a real, natural time. Rather, the necessity of the extant body means that, 
141 BT, 255/H212. 
142 MFL, 153. 
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within the understanding of being made possible by temporality, a disembodied Dasein 
cannot be conceived. 
Yet in spite of the transcendental idealism Heidegger expresses in Being and 
Time, Heidegger voices a commitment to realism elsewhere in the fundamental 
ontological writings. For example, he states: "it is not intrinsic to the essence of Dasein 
as such that it factually exist; it is, however, precisely its essence that in each case this 
being can also not be extant. The cosmos can be without humans inhabiting the earth, 
and the cosmos was long before humans ever existed."143 Here Heidegger suggests that 
temporality arises in the course of a real, natural time, a suggestion that is bolstered in the 
following passage: "When, in the universe of beings, a being attains more being 
[seiender] in the existence of Dasein, i.e. when temporality temporalizes, only then do 
beings have the opportunity to enter the world. "144 Beings enter the world-that is, they 
become meaningful in terms of Dasein's understanding of being-when temporality 
arises from a pre-existent realm of beings. In addition to applying a temporal predicate to 
that which temporality conditions, Heidegger also describes its ontological constitution. 
He states, "World-entry and its occurrence is the presupposition not for extant things to 
become first extant and enter into that which manifests itself to us as its extantness and 
which we understand as such. Rather, world-entry and its occurrence is solely the 
presupposition for extant things announcing themselves in their not requiring world-entry 
143 MFL, 169. 
144 MFL, 193. 
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regarding their own being."145 Here Heidegger is not content merely to posit an 
independent something called "beings," but describes this something as real and extant. 
Elsewhere, Heidegger goes further and describes it as nature, stating that "nature can also 
be when no Dasein exists" and that "the possibility that being is there in the 
understanding presupposes the factical existence of Dasein, and this in turn presupposes 
the factual extantness of nature."146 Heidegger's attempts to describe that which 
temporality conditions reveal that there is a tension between realism and idealism in 
fundamental ontology: Heidegger exhibits a desire to describe the nature of beings taken 
in themselves at the same time as the transcendental nature ofhis project rules out such a 
move in principle. 
The tension between realism and idealism also emerges in Heidegger' s brief 
discussion of Dasein's embodiment in section 10 of The Metaphysical Foundations of 
Logic. In this section, as we have seen, Heidegger makes the twofold sense of "Dasein" 
clear by distinguishing between neutral Dasein, or the event of ontological difference, and 
Dasein as the human being, which he calls "factical Dasein. "147 As the event of 
ontological difference, neutral Dasein is the transcendental condition of possibility of 
145 MFL, 195. 
146 BPP, 170; MFL, 156. 
147 In section 10 of MFL, Heidegger fails strictly to observe the distinction between "factical" and "factual" 
that he draws in BT. In the latter work, "facticity" denotes the "thatness" of the ek-sisting being, whereas 
"factuality" denotes the "thatness" of beings that are merely extant. BT, 82/H56. In section 10, however, 
Heidegger uses both "factical" and "factual" to describe Dasein as it occurs through human beings, 
referring to factical Dasein as "concrete factual humanity." MFL, 137. This blurring of the facticallfactual 
distinction is an indication of the difficulty Dasein's embodiment presents for Heidegger. As embodied, 
Dasein is both ek-sistent and extant, or factical and factual. 
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factical Dasein's ek-sistence. 148 Whereas factical Dasein is plural, neutral Dasein is 
singular and unique. In a purely transcendental approach to the problem of embodiment, 
the plurality of bodies making up factical Dasein would result solely from the 
transcendental structures of neutral Dasein, and would not pertain to any multiplicity 
inherent in that which neutral Dasein conditions This is indeed the approach Heidegger 
seems to take, stating that neutral Dasein "harbours the intrinsic possibility for being 
factically dispersed into bodiliness and thus into sexuality."149 Neutral Dasein harbours 
this possibility through a transcendental structure called "bestrewal" (Streuung). 150 Since 
bestrewal characterizes neutral Dasein, it is not to be understood as the division of some 
primordial being into parts-to think this way would be to construe neutral Dasein as 
something extant.151 Dasein's bestrewal means that the event of ontological difference 
always makes manifest a multiplicity of beings, and never just one. This primordial 
bestrewal is what makes possible the various modes of the ek-sisting human being's 
"dissemination" (Zerstreuung), or its concern with a plurality of beings in its day to day 
affairs. 152 The ek-sisting being "never relates only to a particular object; if it relates 
solely to one object, it does so only in the mode of turning away from other beings that 
148 MFL, 137. 
149 Ibid .. 
ISO MFL, 138. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. The relation between bestrewal and dissemination is unclear. Heidegger uses "dissemination" 
throughout the rest of section 10, not mentioning "bestrewal" again. He also distinguishes between 
"factical" and "transcendental" dissemination. I take "transcendental dissemination" to refer to the 
ontological structure of Dasein called "bestrewal," and "factical dissemination" to refer to the ontic 
manifestations of this structure. 
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are beforehand and at the same time appearing along with the object."153 The plurality of 
human beings is to be understood in a similar way: the human being's dissemination in 
its relations with other human beings, including its sexual relations, are not the result of a 
plurality of extant human bodies preceding the event of ontological difference. It is 
rather the case that "the species-like unification metaphysically presupposes the 
dissemination of Dasein as such."154 In line with a purely transcendental approach to 
embodiment, Heidegger suggests that the human being's or factical Dasein's status as an 
individual that relates to both extant and ek-sisting individuals is made possible not by 
any multiplicity to be found in that which neutral Dasein conditions, but solely by the 
transcendental structure ofbestrewal. 
Yet the realist strain in fundamental ontology emerges here as well. Heidegger 
indicates that Dasein's embodiment cannot be made entirely intelligible solely in terms of 
transcendental structures when he remarks that embodiment functions as "an organizing 
factor" in bestrewal. 155 Bestrewal on its own is not sufficient to account for the plurality 
of factical Dasein. It is also necessary that a plurality of extant bodies organize neutral 
1s3 Ibid. Heidegger's concept of dissemination also appears in Being and Time: "Dasein's facticity is such 
that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed [zerstreut] itself or even split itself up into definite ways of 
Being-in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, 
producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving 
somethig up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, 
determining .... " BT, 83/H56. 
1s4 Another mode of the human being's dissemination is its understanding of itself in terms of the 
multiplicity of events that have occurred within time. A third mode of dissemination is the human being's 
involvement with beings spread out in space. By including spatiality as a concrete manifestation of a more 
fundamental structure of Dasein, Heidegger seems to displace spatiality from its status as an Existenzial. 
This move may be motivated by the necessary link between spatiality and embodiment and by Heidegger's 
discomfort with the latter. 
ISS MFL, 138. 
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Dasein, though exactly what "organization" means in this context is unclear. It cannot 
mean division, since only extant beings can be divided. The plurality of bodies organizes 
neutral Dasein in the sense that it somehow localizes the occurrence of this transcendental 
event. The one event of ontological difference occurs through many bodies-each human 
being understands itself and other beings in terms of an understanding of being. How the 
event of ontological difference can be singular and unique at the same time as it occurs 
through a plurality of human beings is problematic-Frederick Olafson identifies this 
problem as a central paradox in Heidegger's philosophy.156 Heidegger's notion ofbodies 
as organizing neutral Dasein also threatens to lead him into transcendental realism, since 
this notion involves the idea that the transcendental event of ontological difference is 
itself conditioned by a pre-existent ontic plurality. But for now it is sufficient to note 
that with his notion of organization, Heidegger reveals a realist tendency by not only 
positing something external to temporality, but by describing it as well. 
The fact that the tension between realism and idealism in fundamental ontology is 
manifested in a discussion of Dasein's embodiment is no accident. The phenomenon of 
embodiment resists a purely transcendental interpretation. Chapter One showed that the 
body, as something recalcitrant to the categories of presence-at-hand and readiness-to-
hand, is not merely something that emerges in terms of the transcendental structures of 
ek-sistence. Instead, the body also somehow enters into ek-sistence itself. Chapter Two 
confirmed the body's transcendentally constitutive status by showing that factical Dasein 
156 Frederick Olafson, Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 
226. 
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is not something contingent to neutral Dasein, but is somehow integrated into the latter. 
Since the body belongs both to the realm of the transcendental and to the realm of that 
which the transcendental conditions, a fundamental ontological approach to the problem 
of embodiment must somehow mediate between the naturalistic and the transcendental 
approaches. 
3.4 The Idea of Metontology and its Relevance for the Problem of Embodiment 
Heidegger sketches a possible middle way between realism and idealism, and 
between the transcendental and naturalistic approaches to embodiment, in his proposed 
project of a "metontology." Like metaphysics, metontology would have for its subject 
matter the totality of what is (das Seiende im Ganzen). 157 But unlike traditional 
metaphysics, which investigates beings without regard for the ontological difference that 
makes this investigation possible, metontology would investigate beings in the light of 
fundamental ontological insights into the meaning of being.158 Metontology can thus be 
described as a metaphysics that proceeds with an understanding of its transcendental 
condition of possibility. Such an enlightened metaphysics stems from fundamental 
ontology's awareness of its own ontic conditions ofpossibility: 
Since being is there only insofar as beings are already there [im Da], fundamental 
ontology has in it the latent tendency toward a primordial, metaphysical transformation 
which becomes possible only when being is understood in its whole problematic. The 
intrinsic necessity for ontology to turn back to its point of origin can be clarified by 
reference to the primal phenomenon of human existence: the being "man" understands 
being; understanding-of-being effects a distinction between being and beings; being is 
there only when Dasein understands being .... Right within the horizon of the problem of 
157 MFL, 157. 
158 Ibid. 
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being, when posed radically, it appears that all this is visible and can become understood 
as being, only if a possible totality of beings is already there.159 
Fundamental ontology, the attempt to clarify our understanding of being, is only possible 
insofar as the human being and the beings to which it relates somehow precede the 
ontological difference. Turning its attention to beings and transforming into 
metontology, fundamental ontology undergoes an "overturning" (Umschlag) or "turning" 
(Kehre) that marks the beginning of a new, more ontologically enlightened 
metaphysics. 160 
But what is the relevance of metontology for the problem of embodiment? First, 
although Heidegger himself does not identify embodiment as a problem to be treated in 
metontology, mentioning only ethics and spatiality as specific areas of its investigation, 
his mention of each of these areas indicates that embodiment would also be treated.161 A 
careful study of spatiality would inevitably involve considerations of Dasein's 
embodiment, since "oriented Dasein is corporeal Dasein"-that is, since Dasein's 
spatiality requires that it be an extant being amongst others.162 Heidegger's mention of 
ethics as an area of metontological inquiry confirms his characterization of metontology 
as existentiell thinking, a mode of thought concerned not with discerning the 
159 MFL, 156-157. 
160 MFL, 154. Umschlag corresponds to the Greek metabole and gives metontology its name. Robert 
Bernasconi, "The Double Concept of Philosophy and the Place of Ethics in Being and Time," Research in 
Phenomenology 18 (1988): 50. Fundamental ontology's need for a metontological tum-around is also 
mentioned in Being and Time: "Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its departure 
from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has made fast the guiding-line for all 
philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns." BT, 62/H38. 
161 MFL, 138, 157. 
162 HCT, 232. 
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transcendental structures of ek-sistence, but with gaining insight into particular ek-
sistential situations and how best to respond to them.163 Metontology's existentiell 
character indicates that it in its study of beings as a whole, it would devote special 
attention to Dasein as a being.164 In other words, as metontology, fundamental ontology 
shifts its focus from neutral to facti cal Dasein. The metaphysics of Dasein would be an 
important component of metontological thinking, and an important question in the 
metaphysics of Dasein would be how to conceive of the intersection of ek-sistence, 
extantness and life in its body. 
But metontology's relevance for the problem of embodiment does not consist 
primarily in the likelihood that embodiment would be one of the issues up for 
metontological investigation. Metontology's real significance for the problem of 
embodiment is that it involves the notion of a metaphysical ground for the understanding 
of being. That is, metontology involves the idea that the understanding of being can be 
situated within the domain of beings, or that the same sorts of relations that obtain 
between beings can also obtain between beings and the understanding ofbeing. This idea 
is expressed in Heidegger's remark that "the possibility that being is there in the 
understanding presupposes the factical existence of Dasein, and this in turn presupposes 
the factual extantness ofnature."165 In the interpretation of this remark, much depends on 
the sense of "presupposes." The first use of this word is consistent with the 
transcendental nature of fundamental ontology. The understanding of being's 
163 MFL, 157; BT, 33/H12. 
164 William McNeill, "Metaphysics, Fundamental Ontology, Metontology 1925-1935," 75. 
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presupposition of the factical ek-sistence ofDasein means that the understanding of being 
is made possible by temporality: the facticity of Dasein manifests the ekstase of 
alreadiness, ek-sistence that of futurity. 166 
The second use of "presupposes" is more significant. In what sense is temporality 
made possible by the factual extantness of nature? One might respond that temporality 
can only be effective in rendering being intelligible insofar as there are beings upon 
which the understanding of being can operate. Being is inseparable from beings. But if 
this were the sense in which the factual extantness of nature were presupposed, there 
would be no need for Heidegger to specify that upon which the understanding of being 
operates as nature-all that Dasein would presuppose would be an ontic something. 
Heidegger defines nature in two senses: as the material made use of in fashioning and 
using beings as ready-to-hand, and as the "aggregate of the present-at-hand."167 For the 
understanding of being to presuppose the materiality of nature suggests that this 
understanding stands in a relation of material dependence on nature. It would thus have 
the same relation to beings as living beings have to each other and to the earth. In nature 
understood as the aggregate of the present-at-hand, beings are bound together by causal 
and temporal relations. For the understanding of being to presuppose nature as the 
aggregate of the present-at-hand suggests that this understanding arises after other events 
in nature and is in some sense causally grounded in nature. Heidegger relates the 
165 MFL, 156. 
166 Steven Galt Crowell, "Metaphysics, Metontology, and the End of Being and Time," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 60, no. 2 (2000): 321. 
167 BT, 1 OO/H70, 413/H362. 
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understanding of being to beings in this way when he writes that "When, in the universe 
of beings, a being attains more being [seiender] in the existence of Dasein, i.e. when 
temporality temporalizes, only then do beings have the opportunity to enter the world."168 
Heidegger's use of ''when" and "then" to refer to temporality suggests that the event of 
temporalizing occurs within time. Heidegger thus situates temporality within a nexus of 
natural before and after relations, and, if the arising of temporality is to be made at all 
explicable, within the nexus of causal relations as well. In both senses of "nature," then, 
the understanding of being's presupposition of the factual extantness of nature means that 
this understanding itself participates in the same order of relations that it reveals. 
The significance of metontology for the problem of Dasein' s embodiment lies in 
its positing of an ontic ground for the understanding of being. Ifthere is a way in which 
such a grounding can be made intelligible, the result would be an approach to the problem 
of embodiment that would skirt the extremes of naturalism and transcendentalism. For 
although metontology attempts to ground the understanding of being in nature, it avoids 
naturalism by maintaining the transcendental status of this understanding. At the same 
time, it also avoids a purely transcendental account of embodiment by grounding the 
transcendental structures of the understanding of being in the beings it renders 
intelligible.169 Nor would a metontological solution to the problem of Dasein's 
168 MFL, 193. 
169 A metontological approach to the embodiment problem might also grant the phenomenon of resistance a 
more important role than Heidegger is willing to grant it in BT. There Heidegger argues that the 
experience of resistance alone can never give rise to being-in-the-world, since the latter is presupposed in 
any understanding of a being as providing resistance. BT, 176-177/H137. 
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embodiment be merely an afterthought to fundamental ontology. Heidegger emphasizes 
that "to think being as the being of beings and to conceive the being problem radically 
and universally means, at the same time [italics mine], to make beings thematic in their 
totality in the light of ontology."170 The attempt to uncover the meaning of being is 
simultaneously a metaphysical interpretation of beings. Heidegger' s concept of Dasein 
exemplifies this. In his attempt to find the meaning of being in the conditions of the 
possibility of Dasein's understanding of being, Heidegger at the same time interprets 
factical Dasein metaphysically as the coincidence of ek-sistence, extantness and life. 171 
Addressing the problem ofDasein's embodiment in metontology does not mean that the 
problem is relatively unimportant. Rather, a metontological treatment of embodiment 
turns attention back to a problem central to fundamental ontology all along. 
3.5 Metontology and Transcendental Realism 
The obvious difficulty encountered in a metontological approach to the problem 
of embodiment is transcendental realism. To maintain that the understanding of being is 
Max Scheler reverses this order of priority, arguing that "the suffering of resistance is simultaneously the 
basis of the subsequent perceptive and pictorial clarification of what we suffer and of the self we become 
and, secondarily, of the self-consciousness which, as a Dasein-structure that is present as completed, is 
Heidegger's point of departure. The being of the world ... arise[s] out of resistance, the cancellation of 
resistance, and the subsequent view of what has come about." Scheler, "Reality and Resistance: On Being 
and Time, Section 43), Listening 12 (1977): 67. By situating the understanding of being in the realm of 
beings, metontology might allow ontic resistance this genetic function. 
Metontology would also be able to accommodate the Levinasian interpretation of attunement offered by 
Theodore De Boer, who argues that affects such as fatigue and indolence are manifestations of the 
subject's immanence in the something that precedes temporality, a something that is overcome through 
effort and in enjoyment. De Boer, The Rationality of Transcendence (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1997), 
122. 
170 MFL, 157. 
171 The intertwining of metaphysics and fundamental ontology is shown in Heidegger's statement that 
fundamental ontology, "the laying of the ground for metaphysics" is itself "grounded in a metaphysics of 
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related to beings in the same ways as beings are related to each other is to undermine the 
nature of fundamental ontology, which, as a transcendental inquiry, explores a realm 
beyond the domain of what is. But what could lead Heidegger to flirt with such a basic 
error? Stephen Galt Crowell and Joanna Hodge argue that in the years immediately 
following the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger hopes to reinstate the legitimacy 
of metaphysics. Heidegger's ambition is to formulate a mode of inquiry into the totality 
of beings that would not only take into account the meaning of being, but that would also 
show how the transcendental inquiry into the meaning of being is grounded in the ontic 
whole. 172 Heidegger reveals this belief when he questions Kant's purely negative 
assessment of dogmatic metaphysics in his Transcendental Dialectic. While agreeing 
with Kant that metaphysical understanding is illusory when it fails to reflect on its 
transcendental conditions of possibility, Heidegger asks whether these transcendental 
conditions might themselves in some sense presuppose a metaphysical ground.173 Might 
it be possible to grasp Dasein's understanding of being within the context ofbeings as a 
whole? 
The understanding of being is certainly grounded in beings in a hermeneutical 
sense. Heidegger makes it clear that the attempt to interpret the meaning of being cannot 
help but proceed through the use of ideas inherited from tradition. Thus, for example, 
Heidegger acknowledges that his notion of authentic Dasein is developed on the basis of 
Dasein." He goes on to state, "Is it astonishing, then, that a laying of the ground for metaphysics at the 
very least must itselfbe metaphysics, and indeed a preeminent one?" KPM, 157. 
172 Crowell, 311; Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics (London: Routledge, 1995), 177. 
173 KPM, 167-168. 
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the idea of "authentic self-choice," an inherited ek-sistential possibility.174 Insofar as 
metontology thematizes the hermeneutical presuppositions of fundamental ontology, it is, 
as Robert Bernasconi puts it, "a consequence of the fact that the philosopher cannot jump 
over his or her own shadow."175 But ifmetontology is to provide a third approach to the 
problem of embodiment, the understanding of being must be grounded in beings not only 
in a hermeneutical sense, but in a metaphysical sense as well. 
Here metontology runs into the dead end of transcendental realism because of its 
conflation of metaphysical and transcendental philosophy. From a metaphysical 
perspective, the basic question of philosophy is: Why is there anything at all and not 
rather nothing?176 A positive answer to this question must posit an ontic ground for the 
totality of beings. But in the transcendental perspective of fundamental ontology, the 
basic metaphysical question leads back to one still more original: what is the meaning of 
being, that in terms of which we understand that there is something rather than nothing? 
An answer to this question must posit a different kind of ground: a ground for 
intelligibility, which, as transcendental, lies beyond the ontic realm. In the question of 
why there is something rather than nothing, temporality must remain outside of what is 
called into question. When Heidegger remarks that "the primal fact, in the metaphysical 
sense, is that there is anything like temporality at all," he includes temporality within the 
domain of beings, or the domain of all that is not nothing, thus conflating the 
174 MFL, 190. 
175 Bernasconi, "Fundamental Ontology, Metontology, and the Ethics of Ethics," in Irish Philosophical 
Journal4 (1987): 84. 
176 Crowell, 317. 
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metaphysical and transcendental perspectives. 177 When the purity of the transcendental 
perspective is maintained, Heidegger' s realist tendency must give way to his 
transcendental idealism: only insofar as the understanding of being occurs can beings be 
understood as Dasein-independent. To situate the understanding of being within beings 
as a whole is to conflate metaphysical and transcendental inquiry. Locating the 
understanding of being within beings also undermines the ontological difference, 
according to which "Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every 
possible character which an entity may possess."178 Thus while fundamental ontology 
can rest content neither with a purely naturalistic nor with a purely transcendental 
approach to embodiment, neither does it seem capable of finding a middle way between 
the two. After his brief flirtation with the idea of metaphysically grounding 
transcendental inquiry, Heidegger himself seems to have accepted the incoherence of 
such a project, abandoning the notion of metontology in his later work in favour of an 
exclusively phenomenological approach. 179 Metontology fails as a way to understand the 
body of facti cal Dasein as an ontic ground for neutral Dasein since this means falling into 
transcendental realism, thereby transgressing the ontological difference. 
3.6 Other Explanations for the Neglect of Embodiment in Fundamental Ontology 
In spite of the importance of the problem of embodiment for fundamental 
ontology, and despite fundamental ontology's apparent promise to offer an innovative 
solution to this problem, Dasein's corporeity is largely ignored by Heidegger. Having 
177 MFL, 209. 
178 BT, 62/H38. 
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examined the viability for fundamental ontology of some basic approaches to the problem 
of embodiment, Heidegger' s neglect is now more comprehensible. While neither the 
purely naturalistic nor the purely transcendental approach to embodiment is adequate 
within the framework of fundamental ontology, the metontological approach, a middle 
way between the two extremes, gets stranded on the reef of transcendental realism. 
Having erected a system of concepts that stands in the way of a satisfactory account of 
Dasein's embodiment, Heidegger allows the intersection of ek-sistence and extantness, or 
of neutral Dasein and facti cal Dasein, to remain obscure. 
Other writers on Heidegger have also commented on his neglect of the body, and 
it remains to be seen how their explanations for this neglect complement my own. Didier 
Franck argues that Heidegger is forced to neglect Dasein's embodiment because it 
involves a coincidence between life and ek-sistence that simply cannot be made 
intelligible in terms of the conceptual framework of fundamental ontology. Franck writes 
that "since we are incarnate, the body ought to be rooted, in the manner of everything that 
results from our Being, in existence, but as alive it cannot be so."180 The living body 
resists integration into ek-sistence because for Heidegger, life is a mode of being distinct 
from ek-sistence that is constituted by a unique, though mysterious, mode of time. 181 
Life, like extantness, is made manifest by ek-sistence, and does not ground the latter. 182 
Franck argues that an adequate account of Dasein's embodiment must reverse this order 
179 Crowell, 331. 
18° Franck, "Being and Living," 146. 
181 BT, 396/H346; FCM, 259. 
182 BT, 75/H50. 
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of priority: attunement, one of the essential aspects of ek-sistence, arises on the basis of 
biological drives. 183 But for Heidegger to posit life, a mode of being that emerges in the 
light of ek-sistence, as the ground for ek-sistence would mean grounding the 
understanding of being in the realm of what is. This would violate the ontological 
difference, a consequence Franck explicitly acknowledges, writing that "only the 
relegation of ontological difference can render our bodily animality thinkable."184 Since, 
in the context of fundamental ontology, transcendental realism means undermining 
ontological difference, Franck's criticism of Heidegger's neglect of embodiment 
obliquely points to the risk of transcendental realism that the problem of embodiment 
poses for Heidegger. 
Paul Ricoeur argues that Heidegger neglects embodiment in Being and Time 
because addressing it would lead the existential analytic into an inauthentic understanding 
of Dasein.185 Inauthentic understanding devotes its attention to beings at the expense of 
being, and since the body is one being amongst others, an examination of Dasein as 
embodied might threaten to lead the existential analytic away from neutral Dasein and to 
ensnare it in factical Dasein instead. Further, Heidegger seems to view Dasein's 
embodiment as a major culprit in its tendency towards inauthentic understanding. In 
Being and Time, Heidegger remarks that Dasein should not allow itself to be governed by 
its urge the live. Instead, the urge to live is to be directed by the possibilities revealed in 
183 Franck, 145. 
1841bid. 
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authentic understanding.186 In the Davos Disputation with Ernst Cassirer, Heidegger 
states, "What [Dasein] depends on is the original unity and the immanent structure of the 
relatedness of a human being which to a certain extent has been fettered [gefesselt] in a 
body and which, in the fetteredness [Gefesseltheit] in the body, stands in a particular 
condition of being bound up with being~."187 Heidegger's use of the word "fettered" to 
describe Dasein's embodiment suggests a negative assessment of this phenomenon. 
Bound up with beings through its body, Dasein's absorption in beings is encouraged by 
bodily drives, making it even more difficult to raise the question of what it means for 
beings to be. Though Heidegger's neglect of embodiment can be explained as the result 
of his concern to foster authentic understanding, it is also important to recognize that a 
satisfactory account of Dasein requires that Dasein come into thematic view as a being. 
As shown in Chapter Two, the structures of neutral Dasein presuppose the extantness of 
factical Dasein, which means that both aspects of Dasein, and especially their relation, 
must be explained in order for Dasein to be made intelligible. Heidegger, even granted 
the importance of authentic understanding, cannot evade the task of accounting for 
Dasein's embodiment, a task difficult to accomplish without running aground on 
transcendental realism. Ricoeur' s account of why Heidegger neglects embodiment in 
fundamental ontology, like Franck's, complements my own. 
185 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blarney (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
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David Cerbone argues that Heidegger' s neglect of embodiment in the existential 
analytic is warranted by the fact that Dasein's embodiment can only be explicated after 
the explication of being-in-the-world.188 Only once the various structures of ek-sistence 
have been discerned does the body come into proper phenomenological view. Heidegger 
himself makes this argument. In the Zo/likon Seminars, he states that "the phenomena of 
the body cannot be adequately treated without a sufficient elaboration of the basic 
characteristics of existential being-in-the-world."189 But metontology would seem to 
involve just such an approach to Dasein's embodiment: after fundamental ontology has 
explicated being-in-the-world through the existential analytic, it is to recoil into a 
metontological investigation of its ontic roots. And, as this chapter has shown, the body 
can only be construed as a natural ground for Dasein at the risk of falling into 
transcendental realism. Ultimately Heidegger neglects the problem of embodiment in 
fundamental ontology because this inevitable problem threatens his project with 
transcendental realism. A voiding this error is the major challenge a fundamental 
ontological solution to the problem of embodiment must overcome. 
188 Cerbone, "Heidegger and Dasein's 'Bodily Nature': What is the Hidden Problernatic?"225. 
189 zs, 202. 
84 
Conclusion 
Heidegger's Approach to Dasein's Embodiment in the Zollikon Seminars 
A study of the problem of embodiment in fundamental ontology would be 
incomplete without an ex~ination of the Zollikon Seminars, which Heidegger, at the 
behest of the Swiss psychiatrist Medard Boss, gave to a group of doctors between 1959 
and 1969 in the town of Zollikon, Switzerland. In these seminars, Heidegger returns to 
the concept of being-in-the-world he had developed in Being and Time and finally 
addresses the question of body's role in Dasein. As if in response to critics such as de 
Waelhens and Franck, who argue that ek-sistence presupposes the extant body, Heidegger 
acknowledges that being-in-the-world would not be possible if Dasein were not 
embodied. 190 In response to Sartre, who had complained that Heidegger hardly devotes 
any attention to the body in Being and Time, Heidegger states, "I can only counter 
Sartre's reproach by stating that the bodily [das Leibliche] is the most difficult [to 
understand] and that I was unable to say more at that time."191 This thesis concludes with 
an account of what Heidegger says about the body when he finally devotes his attention 
to it in the 1960s. Does he provide an account ofDasein's embodiment that is consistent 
with the transcendental project of fundamental ontology while also avoiding 
transcendental realism? An examination of Heidegger's remarks on embodiment in the 
Zollikon Seminars reveals that although Heidegger provides some interesting 
phenomenological insights into the experience of embodiment, the problem of 
190 zs, 231. 
191 zs, 231. 
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embodiment is once agam largely ignored. While Heidegger does develop an ek-
sistential conception of being embodied, he neglects the problem of how the body 
functions as the point of intersection between ek-sistence and extantness, or between 
neutral and factical Dasein. 
Central to Heidegger's discussion of the body in the seminars is the distinction 
between the body as a corporeal object amongst others (Korper, or what, following 
Merleau-Ponty, I call the objective body) and the body as it emerges in pre-reflective 
experience (Leib, or what, following Merleau-Ponty, I call the lived body). According to 
Heidegger, if we are to understand the body's role in being-in-the-world, we must be 
careful that we conceive of the body not as Korper, but as Leib.192 As Korper, or as 
objective, the body occupies a volume of space and is perceptible by the senses. As Leib, 
or as lived, the body is neither an object within space nor something that can be presented 
to the senses. 193 Instead, the body as lived is the aspect of Dasein that provides access to 
beings through its powers of motility and sensibility. Every encounter with beings 
involves the lived body: I see beings through bodily vision, I hear them through bodily 
hearing, I manipulate them through the body's powers of motility.194 Even in imagining 
beings I experience them in terms of my lived body, insofar as I imagine myself sensing 
and moving them.195 
192 ZS, 86. 
193 zs, 82. 
194 zs, 96, 108. 
195 zs, 162. 
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But how exactly does this lived body function as an aspect of Dasein? In a move 
that recalls the metontological program of interpreting factical Dasein in the light of 
temporality, Heidegger conceives the lived body as a "bodying" (Leiben) of the body.196 
Interpreted in terms of being-in-the-world, the lived body is not one of the beings 
encountered in Dasein, but an aspect of the event of ontological difference. Like the 
Existenzialen described in Being and Time, Dasein's body is not a ''what," but a "how." 
The body, as one of the manifestations of temporality, functions as that in terms ofwhich 
beings are disclosed, and thus cannot be properly described as something that is. Neither 
temporality nor the body are; instead, temporality temporalizes, and the body bodies. 
The way the body bodies is determined by the way beings emerge in ek-sistence.197 
When a being emerges as a flicker of candlelight, my body bodies in the mode of 
seeing.198 When a being emerges as a spoken word, my body bodies in the mode of 
hearing.199 In any encounter with beings, the body bodies. Thus Heidegger states that 
bodying "co-determines" being-in-the-world.200 But Heidegger is also careful to 
emphasize that while bodying is necessary for being-in-the-world, it only suffices for the 
emergence of beings as beings on the basis of the understanding of being, which is 
ontologically more primordial.201 Richard Askay explains Heidegger's position well: 
"Bodily being is necessary for us to be related to the world in any situation. Being-in-
196 ZS, 86. 
197 zs, 86. 
198 ZS, 108. 
199 zs, 96. 
200 ZS, 86, 199. 
201 ZS, 81, 186, 197,200. 
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the-world is necessary for there to be any relations at all since it is primarily an 
understanding ofbeing in which anything else is possible, i.e., existence is ontologically 
more primordial than bodily being."202 For Heidegger, the body only bodies insofar as it 
is taken up into the transcendental event of temporality. 
Heidegger' s conception of the body as a necessary but insufficient aspect of 
being-in-the-world raises the question of how temporality operates through the body, 
which is also an extant being amongst others. The body not only bodies, thereby helping 
to reveal a world, but is also subject to forces exerted upon it by other bodies-it is only 
in our dreams that the body opens up a world without itself being subject to corporeal 
limitations. 203 In sensing and manipulating beings, their resistance to my effort testifies 
to the extantness of my body. Resistance is a necessary and constitutive aspect ofbeing-
in-the-world, for if nothing resisted my effort, beings would never emerge for me.204 I am 
only aware of acting through my body insofar as it, along with the corporeal nature into 
which I am incarnated, resists my effort. Without this resistance, I, imagining I could 
speak of an "I" at all, would be a sort of dormant consciousness floating through a void. 
The bodying of the body can only contribute to being-in-the-world insofar as the body is 
also extant. As this thesis has shown, how to conceive of the body's double status 
without falling into transcendental realism is the problem Dasein's embodiment poses for 
fundamental ontology. 
202 Richard Askay, "Heidegger, the Body, and the French Philosophers," in Continental Philosophy Review 
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In the Zollikon Seminars, Heidegger does not address this problem. Indeed, at the 
outset of his discussion of the body, he states: "We will now try to move somewhat closer 
to the phenomenon of the body. In doing so, we are not speaking of a solution to the 
problem of the body. Much has already been gained merely by starting to see this 
problem."205 Both the seminars and the project of fundamental ontology leave the 
problem of embodiment largely unaddressed. The challenge of rendering intelligible 
Dasein's embodiment at the same time as avoiding transcendental realism still stands. 
In closing, I would like to address what may be a lingering suspicion: Is 
Heidegger, despite his criticisms of the Cartesian picture of the human being as a 
combination of an extant body and soul, committed to some form of mind/body dualism? 
Several commentators have raised this possibility.206 And Heidegger indeed makes some 
remarks that evoke the Cartesian specter. Medard Boss records Heidegger as saying: 
Then everything we call our bodiliness, down to the last muscle fiber and down to the 
most hidden molecule of our hormones, belongs essentially to existing ..... This bodily 
[nature] develops in such a way that it can be used in dealing with the inanimate and 
animate "material things" which are encountered. Yet, in contrast to a tool, the bodily 
spheres of existing are not set free [entlassen] from being-human. They cannot be cared 
for in a toolbox. Rather, they remain in the sway of being human, held in it, and belong 
to it so long as the human being lives. Of course, in dying this bodily domain changes 
its way of being into that of an inanimate thing, into the substance of a corpse, which 
drops out [herausfallen] from existence.207 
Heideggerian dualism would not be a matter of causal relations obtaining between a 
corporeal and a spiritual substance, but of one mode of being, ek-sistence, supervening on 
205 zs, 81. 
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another, extantness. Death would not be the separation of body and soul, but the 
cessation of the extant body's participation in ek-sistence. A dualistic conception of 
human being is also suggested in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, where 
Heidegger states that "Dasein is thrown, factical, throughly amidst nature through its 
bodiliness, and transcendence lies in the fact that these beings, among which Dasein is 
and to which Dasein belongs, are surpassed by Dasein. In other words, as transcending, 
Dasein is beyond nature, although, as factical, it remains environed by nature. As 
transcending, i.e., as free, Dasein is something alien to nature."208 In Heideggerean 
dualism, as in the Cartesian variety, the human being is free at the same time as it is 
subject to the laws of nature. But whereas for Descartes human freedom consists in the 
free will of the res cogitans, for Heidegger it consists in the human being's status as that 
through which the spontaneous event of ontological difference occurs. 
But in spite of such similarities between the ontologies of Descartes and 
Heidegger, the transcendental nature of fundamental ontology makes it inappropriate to 
characterize Heidegger' s account of the human being as dualistic in the Cartesian sense. 
For Descartes, the incommensurables that must relate to one another both belong to the 
same ontological realm-mind and body are both finite substances. But for Heidegger, 
the incommensurables are not found in the same ontological domain and cannot condition 
one another. Whereas the extant body belongs to the realm of beings, ek-sistence, the 
elaboration of ontological difference, is a transcendental event, something that lies 
207 zs, 232. 
208 MFL, 166. 
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beyond the domain of what is. To ask how ek-sistence and extantness can condition each 
other is to situate ek-sistence within the extant, thereby violating the purity of ontological 
difference and slipping into transcendental realism. Thus while the mind/body problem 
in Descartes shares certain affinities with the neutral Dasein/factical Dasein problem in 
Heidegger, the latter problem, as a problem that runs up against the limits of 
transcendental philosophy, is of a different kind. Heidegger's neglect of the problem of 
embodiment is motivated not by a latent Cartesian dualism, but by the threat of 
transcendental realism this problem presents for fundamental ontology. In light of 
Heidegger's strict distinction between being and beings, the inevitable problem of 
embodiment presents fundamental ontology with a formidable challenge. In the attempt 
to discover the meaning of being, embodiment is, as Heidegger describes it, "the most 
difficult problem."209 
209 Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink, Heraclitus Seminar, trans. Charles H. Seibert (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1993}, 146. 
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